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ABSTRACT

Revolutionary Idealists to Revolutionary Statesmen:
A Sample Abstract

by

Benjamin Carlos Montoya

Dr. Paul W. W erth, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

From 1917 to 1922, the Bolsheviks conducted a foreign policy that melded their
background in Marxist ideology with the exigencies of state power. The Bolsheviks believed
an international revolution would imitate their socialist revolution of October 1917. W hen
it became clear this would not happen, V.I. Lenin and his comrades chose to preserve their
revolution in Russia.
The Bolsheviks believed peace would induce revolution throughout war-torn Europe.
After the October Revolution the Bolsheviks immediately sought an end to the Great War.
Only Germany accepted this proposal of peace, however, and the Bolsheviks were forced to
accept a harsh peace treaty that stripped much of Russia’s holdings.
Despite this blow to their revolutionary drive, the Bolsheviks believed the peace with
Germany allowed consolidation of revolutionary forces in Russia. Since Europe’s working-
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classes failed to incite a socialist uprising, the Bolsheviks incorporated state power to
organize and prepare the grounds for international revolution.
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Tl faut reculer, pour meiux sauter.’”
[“You have to step back to make a better jump.”]
—V.I. Lenin
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INTRODUCTION
The Bolsheviks melded their background in Marxist tradition with their conduct of
foreign relations during the early years of Soviet Russia. They believed their revolutionary
form of foreign policy would create a foundation for international proletarian revolution
envisioned by Karl Marx. Since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did not formulate explicitly
a foreign policy agenda for revolutionary socialism, the Bolsheviks (after October 1917)
had to manage a foreign policy that met both the exigencies of state power and
corroborated their Marxist tradition/education. This was no easy process. Many Bolsheviks
disagreed on the proper conduct of foreign policy for Soviet Russia.
Marxism states that socialist revolution is the only force that can liberate the working
masses from capitalist overlords. For the realization of a genuine socialist society, Marx and
Engels postulated, socialist revolution must assume an international character. Workers of
one state could not be free completely if their proletarian brethren were still being
oppressed in another state. Proletarian solidarity was (;he essential prerequisite for a
Marxist revolution. The state played a vital role in this Marxist form of revolution. Despite
viewing the state as the bourgeois tool of oppression over the proletariat, Marx believed
state power would play a critical role in the foundation of socialism. By seizing the reins of
power through revolution, the working masses could implement state power for the
destruction of bourgeois influence in the world. Centralized state power comprised an
essential com ponait of Marx’s dictum for revolution by providing organization and
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solidarity. Institutional power would serve as a beacon for proletarian organization by
allowing the centralization of revolutionary forces against the bourgeoisie. Marx believed
that after the bourgeoisie were effectively eradicated, the state as an institutional apparatus
would “wither away.” Centralized power would become obsolete as a socialist society was
created, and everyone lived according to their needs.
The Marxian prediction of international revolution, however, proved unfounded.
Marxist revolution was supposed to be a spontaneous uprising by the proletarian masses of
the entire European continent. Lenin and his comrades viewed the Creat W ar as the socio
political crisis that would instigate international proletarian revolution; years of
oppressive/total war would prompt Europe’s war-weary workingclasses into spontaneous
revolt against their bourgeois governments. The Bolsheviks viewed their October
Revolution of 1917 as the first step in this process. By the end of the Creat W ar in
November 1918 and the demise of the Cerman Revolution in January 1919, however,
Europe’s workingclasses had failed to incite international revolution. The Bolsheviks stood
alone to preserve the initiative for Marxian revolution. The Bolsheviks were faced with the
predicament of balancing their Marxist background with the exigencies of state power.
They were faced with two scenarios: place all efforts into galvanizing (forcing) international
revolution, or retreat and preserve the Russian state. Anarchic elements in the party, led by
Nikolai Bukharin, believed the Bolsheviks should abandon all efforts to preserve the state
apparatus, and instead replicate their revolution on a European-wide stage. “Defensist”
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voices of the party, led by Vladimir Il’yich Lenin, *believed state power was the only
institution able to preserve the socialist revolution in Russia.
This work will demonstrate how the Bolsheviks, through their foreign diplomacy,
attempted to reconcile these two imperatives: 1.) remaining true to their Marxist teachings
and, 2.) preserving the revolution they had fought so hard to produce. By giving specific
attention to foreign policy, I will «qplain how doctrinal obligations of Marxism shaped the
Bolshevik’s worldview; also, I will demonstrate how socio-political exigencies shaped the
ways in which the Bolsheviks (reinterpreted their Marxian philosophy regarding revolution
and state power. Analysis of Soviet foreign relations will reveal how the Bolsheviks justified
their revolutionary policies by rooting them in Marxian dialectics.
“Foreign policy” is difficult to define in the Soviet oqierience. Up to October 1917, the
Bolsheviks were in no position whatsoever to conduct foreign relations on behalf of Russia.
Even after the Bolsheviks gained power, the nature of their revolution in Russia lent a
special character to their revolutionary policy. Socialist revolution was intended to reshape
not just political structures of states, but also social structures. Therefore, the Bolsheviks
sought to reshape the social character of Europe. Their revolution would initiate the
process of cleansing Europe of capitalism and liberating the proletariat from their
bourgeois overlords. Bolshevik foreign policy, th a i, had the underlying goal of inciting
international revolution. During the immediate weeks after the October Revolution,
Bolshevik foreign policy consisted of agitating for proletarian revolution throughout the
' V.I Lenin’s role is this dd>ate is central to this pqter. His contribatim to the ultimate meAod of Soviet
foreign policy from October 1917 to tite early 1920s was indnpens^le. Thoefore, mudb attention will be
devotedtoLenin’swordsanddeedsthioughoiitthis work. Indeed, no other figure in early Sovia history
was as crucial to die survival ami consolidation of Soviet Russia as Lenin. Despite being hounded by
criticism for the nature of his revolutionary policies between October 1917 and the eatiy 1920s, Lenin
displayed acute political skill in fire maintenance of the young socialist republic.

4
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rest of Europe. Revolutionary foreign policy was a diplomacy to the people, over the heads
of European governments. W hen gjobal revolution failed to materialize preservation of the
socialist state (Soviet Russia) became the prime objective for Bolshevik foreign policy.
Thereafter, the Bolsheviks had to deal directly with European heads of state. Treaties and
agreements were necessary to postpone the forceful downfall of revolutionary power in
Russia. Despite many setbacks and “compromises" Lenin and his comrades remained
committed to their goal of international revolution. They formulated a foreign diplomacy
with European governments, while attempting to maintain relations with Europe’s working
classes. Thus, Bolshevik foreign policy had a dual character: preserving the socialist state,
and provoking international proletarian revolution.
This work deals with foreign policy specifically, but has a larger overall scope. It will be
a social history of the Bolshevik Party; it will demonstrate how the Bolsheviks evolved from
revolutionary idealists to revolutionary statesmen. Before 1914, the Bolsheviks were just
another element of a larger social-democratic movement in Europe. By 1922 they had
become became the vanguard of European sociakdemocracy. Surviving years of total war,
revolution and civil war, earned the Bolsheviks the right to speak for the international
workers’ movement. They viewed themselves as the protectors of Marxian revolution, and
viewed their state (Soviet Russia) as the foundation for that revolution.
This thesis initially argued that the Bolsheviks after October 1917, categorically
abandoned the initiative for international revolution by seeking to preserve state power in
the form of Soviet Russia. Preserving revolution in one country, the initial argument
stated, altered the international socialist movement into a specifically Russian experience,
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and thereby undermined Marxian revolution. The right question was being asked but in
the wrong manner. The original approach asked how Bolsheviks dtanged following October
1917. The administration of foreign policy seemed to demonstrate the Bolshevik shift from
being idyllic revolutionaries to calculating bureaucrats. This approach neglected a caitral
component of Bolshevik identity; a thread that ran through their interpretation of the
Great W ar to the acquisition of state power and beyond—their Marxian philosophy. The
initial argument failed to recognize that the Bolsheviks viewed every socio-political turn in
European affairs through a Marxist lens. And more importantly, the original argument
failed to discern that the Bolsheviks were obligated to validate their socio-political policies
with the revolutionary credo of Karl Marx. Determined to maintain their credibility with
proletarian constituencies, the Bolsheviks understood that revolutionary policies had to
corroborate the doctrinal mandate of Marx. There could be no haphazard adjustment in
tactics or philosophy. The maintenance of legitimacy was crucial for the Bolsheviks; their
ultimate success depended on it. If they failed to uphold the dictum of Marx, the
proletarian masses would withdraw their support and leave the Bolsheviks “in the lurch.”
Therefore the revised approach asks how the Bolsheviks reinterpreted Marxism to fit their
revolutionary policies. This was not always easy for the Bolsheviks, since Marx never
discussed ecplicitly the proper course for a revolutionary government surrounded by
bourgeois enemies.
The revised argument asserts that the Bolsheviks did not violate their Marxian mandate
for international proletarian revolution. After October 1917, Bolshevik revolutionary
policy became ad hoc foreign diplomacy. W hen an international proletarian uprising failed
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to materialize after the October Revolution, it became clear to the Bolsheviks that they
would have to preserve the revolutionary spirit of Marxism alone. The Bolsheviks
converted their revolutionary tactic of socio-political agitation into a policy of state defense
with the onset of civil war, the failure of the German Revolution in 1919 and the failure of
“revolution from without” through the Russo-Polish W ar in 1920. Curtailing revolutionary
phrases was necessary for the preparation of a proletarian uprising. Consolidating
“socialism in one country” would make the international effort for revolution more
possible, the Bolsheviks argued.
While examining the Bolshevik experiment with diplomacy Marxism will be seen as a
flexible philosophy that allows for (re)interpretation. Marxist doctrine allows
reevaluation(s) of its dialectics. It is written in such a way that central tenets of its
philosophy are understood, but the methods to their fulfillment are open for discussion.
This theme will be revealed explicitly in the portion discussing affirmative and negative
responses to Bolshevism from contemporary socialists. All Marxists-whether Mensheviks
or Bolsheviks, Nikolai Bukharin and Karl Kautsky or Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir
Lenin—believed unconditionally in Marxist doctrine. And yet these socialists interpreted
Marxian philosophy in distinctly different ways.
A common perception in the historiography of Soviet foreign relations is that Lenin
and the Bolsheviks, after the October Revolution of 1917, abandoned their credo for
international revolution for preservation of the state. Raison d’etat, is it argued, took
precedence over the promotion of socialism in Europe. Richard Debo argues that
Bolshevik revolutionary policy went through a dramatic shift between 1917 and 1918. The
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Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, Debo states, expecting an international
proletarian uprising in response to their socialist revolution. W hen it became apparent that
the proletarian masses would not imitate Bolshevik actions, Lenin and his colleagues
became disenchanted. Debo believes the Bolsheviks pushed their revolutionary theory into
the background by seeking simple survival. “Preservation of the Soviet state became the
keystone of Lenin’s new policy,” Debo states. “The effect, however, was to shift the focus of
Bolshevik policy from promoting world revolution to guaranteeing the survival of the
Soviet state.” ^ Lenin, according to Debo, “explicitly abandoned the great hopes of late
1917.” * And althcàigfr Bolshevik spokesmen continued to mouth the rhetoric of 1917-18,
Debo continues, there was no return to a genuinely revolutionary foreign policy. “[Tjhey
sought exactly the opposite . . . . [the Bolsheviks would now] build barriers between
themselves and the outside world, to create defensible frontiers behind which the Soviet
order could be nurtured.” ^
Piero Melograni agrees with Debo. Melograni boldly claims that those historians who
state that Lenin continued to believe that world revolution was imminent from 1917 to
1920 are implying that he was “an inept politician who committed a fundamental error in
foreseeing future events, thus misleading himself and others over a long period of time.” *
Like Debo, Melograni believes the Bolsheviks altered drastically their revolutionary policy
after an international revolution failed to develop. In reaction to this, Melograni argues,
the Bolsheviks had to consolidate state power-what Melograni calls a “state without
* Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy o fSovietRussia, 1917-18 (Toronto:
Universitir of Toronto Press, 1979), 419.
* Ibid., 183.
"Ibid., 407.
®Piero Melograni, Lentn and the Myth o fRevolution: Ickology and Reasons o f^a te, 1917-1920 (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), xii.
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revolution.” “Not only did [this state] block the revolutionary aspirations of Russian
socialism, but it was also a state that looked inward, that closed itself up in its diversity,
that gave up its designs of global rwolution.” ®According to Melograni, this was a sacrifice
Lenin was willing to make. He knew that Bolshevik power could only survive if there were
a state power to defend it, Lenin was a realist, Melograni argues, and that is how he
managed to hold on to power through the tumultuous years after 1917. After the decision
was made to adopt a defensive posture, Melograni continues, Lenin may not have wanted
socialist revolution in the rest of Europe. Lenin knew a “revolutionary uprising in
Germany or some other European country could create serious problems for Russian
Bolshevism.” ^ Melograni points to the difference between the Bolsheviks and other
socialist parties of the belligerent nations. He argues that Bolshevik radicalism was
repulsive to socialist parties like the German Social Democratic Party.
Adam Ulam criticizes the Bolshevik translation of Marxism into revolutionary foreign
policy. Ulam believes Marx and Engels had nothing to say about the proper form of foreign
diplomacy for a socialist country. This was because “the very internationalism of the
doctrine is based paradoxically on the assumption that considerations of international
politics have become and will continue to be less important." ®Centralized foreign policy
was irrelevant to Marx and Engels, because they believed socialist revolution would sweep
away the institution that conducted diplomacy—the state. Economic relations, characterized
by class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, were the agent of historical

*lbid. xi.
’ Ibid.
* Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History o fSoviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New YoA,
Praega Publishers, 1968), 13.

9
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change for Marx and Engels. The preparation and prosecution for international revolution
were the only tasks for socialists. Ulam argues that Marx and Engels believed socialist
revolution would occur in every country as it reached a high level of industrialization; this
revolution would not be substantially affected by any developments on the international
scene. ’ A socialist revolution in Russia, an agrarian country, would have been
inconceivable to Marx and Engels.

Russia was not highly industrialized and thus did not

possess a substantial working class constituency. Also, Russia did not posses a heightened
sense of capitalism, had not undergone a bourgeois revolution, and was (for all intents and
purposes) still a feudal society. For Ulam, this made the Bolshevik’s self-appointed role as
protector and prosecutor of socialist revolution problematic. The outlook of original
Marxism, Ulam states, “was internationalist, and it would have been inconceivable for
Marx that his policies of international socialism should be dictated by one party or one
country.” “ The theoretical basis for Bolshevik foreign policy, Ulam argues, was
fundamentally flawed from the beginning.
A closer look at the evidence shows that Lenin and cohorts did not abandon their hope
for international revolution after October 1917. In some cases, in fact, they held onto it for
such an extended period of time that their policies bordered on obsession. For the
Bolsheviks, Soviet Russia was always viewed as a springboard for international revolution.

®Ibid.
Friedridi Engels did concede, however, that Russia was rqre for a bourgeois revolution. In a letter to a
Russian socialist in 1874, Engels wrote‘’Russia is undoubtedty on die eve of a revolution . . . [A]
revolution, which started by the upper classes of the c ^ ta l, p e ih ^ even die government itseUT, must be
npidly carried further, beyond the first constitudonal |diase, by the peasants!. Russia is on the brink] of a
revoludon whidi will be of die greatest irrportance for the whole of Eunqie if only because it will destroy
at one blow the last, so for intact, reserve of the entire European reactiotL” Robert C. Tucker, ed.. The
Manc-EngelsReader (New York and Lmidon, W.W. Norton & Cfompany, 1978), 675.
” Ulam, Expansion and Coexstence, 16.

10
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Centralized state power would serve as a conduit for a socialist uprising. The Bolsheviks
believed they could consolidate the impetus for socialism, foster its growth, and unleash its
power (when ready) by utilizing the state. Lenin and his colleagues were fully aware that
Russia was not supposed to be the birthplace for socialist revolution; however, when their
revolution succeeded, and (more importantly) when the German revolution failed, the
Bolsheviks had to adapt their revolutionary policy. According to Teddy Uldricks, Lenin’s
Imperialism provided the theoretical framework for Bolshevik foreign policy. By correlating

distinct national societies and global relationships alongside class conflict, Lenin correlated
economic struggle with political struggle. The overthrow of the political state became just
as relevant as the overthrow of the economic system. This improvised of Marxism formed a
central tenet of Bolshevik revolutionary policy after the failure of international revolution.
“Imperialism,” Uldricks states, “supplied the theoretical justification for making necessary
accommodations with the capitalist states, in addition to suggesting where the most
advantageous compromises might be made."

Preservation of state power became the

overriding task of the Bolsheviks because preservation of Soviet Russia meant the
protection of socialist revolution. Any compromises were permissible as long as Bolshevik
state power was maintained.
Both Jon Jacobson and R.C. Nation reject the notion of Russian nationalism during
the first tumultuous years of Bolshevik state power. “[F]oreign relations,” Jacobson states,
“were central to the political imagination of the Bolsheviks and to their actual political
behavior from the day they came to power” because Marxism was an inherently

Teddy Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: Hie Origins o fSoviet Foreign Relations. 1917-1930 (London
and Beverly Hill: SAGE Publications, 1979), 147.
11
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internationalist doctrine.

Jacobson believes the Bolsheviks after October 1917 utilized

foreign policy to incite world revolution. W hen this international revolution failed to
materialize, the Bolsheviks were forced to hunker down and consolidate state power. This
was not so much an act of political greed as revolutionary expediency. The attempt to
pursue an effective national security policy in a hostile world without sacrificing at least a
“pro forma commitment” to its founding ideals is the essence of what Nation describes as
the “Soviet security dilemma.”

According to Nation, the October Revolution was

originally justified as an act of revolutionary internationalism. “The Bolshevik regime,”
Nation claims, “based its claims to legitimacy on a set of assumptions that portrayed Soviet
power as an agent of progressive social change, called down judgment on the dominant
international order, and sought to negate the very idea of ‘national’ security as traditionally
understood.”

These aspirations were not easily surrendered. Nation continues. Hence

the dilemma when the German proletariat and others left the call for revolution
unanswered. Bolshevik foreign policy had to accomplish two goals simultaneously: preserve
Soviet Russia as the basis for socialist revolution, and maintain Bolshevik legitimacy as the
protector of Marxian socialism. Nation disagrees with historians who dismiss the Soviet
approach to foreign policy as a function of fixed determinants such as geostrategic
constraints or Russian national traits. The Soviet approach to security, Nation states, “was
characterized by adaptability and dynamic evolution as well as by continuity.”

Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Beriœley: University of California Press,
1994), 7.
’"R. Q aig Nation, B/ocfcJEartfc, Red Star: A Hisdory o f Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca and
London, Cornell University Press, 1992), xüi.
Ibid, xii.
Ibid, xiv.
12
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The Bolsheviks always kept their eye on the development of class conflict in Europe.
Lenin and his colleagues tvere disenchanted by the failure of international revolution and
they did retreat into the doctrine “socialism in one country"; however, they did not, as
Debo claims, “build barriers” between themselves and the outside world. They adamantly
believed their revolution in Russia would be complete only when workers from the rest of
Europe emulated the actions of the Russian proletariat. The Bolsheviks, then, depended
on assistance from the European workingclasses, and they sought to incite international
revolution through agitation and propaganda.
Contrary to Melograni’s claim that the Soviet state blocked the revolutionary
aspirations of the Bolsheviks, it is more correct to argue that the state buttressed the
revolutionary hopes of the Party. T hrou^out the immediate post-October years, Lenin
and his colleagues viewed Soviet Russia as a transitory stage in the preparation for a wider,
international revolution; revolution would be preserved through the strength of a
centralized institution. The Soviet state was the revolution; revolution was the state. W ith
the state playing such a crucial role in the development of international revolution, it could
only follow that the foreign policy (international relations) of that state would influence
greatly the fostering of a proletarian uprising. And while Ulam believes the Bolsheviks
deviated from their Marxian credentials by formulating a centralized foreign policy, he does
not seem to consider that that foreign policy was founded on the basis of accomplishing
two fundamental components of Marxian revolution—preparation and prosecution. The
Soviet state, the Bolsheviks reasoned, would serve as the spearhead for international

13
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revolution. Soviet Russia would organize proletarian masses, and (when the time was right)
prosecute international revolution.

14
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CHAPTER I.

THE GREAT WAR “SCHISM”
The outbreak of world war in August 1914 split the social-democratic movement in
Europe. A “schism” took place among those socialist parties that advocated national
defense of their countries, and those parties that called for international proletarian
revolution. The majority of social-democratic movements fell into the first or “defaisist”
category. Most notable of these groups was the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD).
The SPD had been the spearhead of the European workingclass movement for much of
the time between German unification (1871) and the outbreak of the Great War.
Possessing the largest base of workers, who had experienced a speedy industrialization after
1871, and forming a strong center of power in central Europe, the SPD was the example all
other socialist parties followed. The SPD also found legitimacy in the fact that the credo of
modem socialist thought—Marxism-was developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
both of German decent.
The advent of war created an atmosphere of national solidarity in Germany that had
no precedent in any other period. Carl Schorske states that “the internal tensions of
German society seemed to find their release in the prospective struggle against the external
enemy.” ” The SPD voted for war credits during the wave of patriotism that swept

’’Carl Schwske, German Social Democracy: The Development o fthe Great War Schism, 1905-1917 (New
Yoric, John Wilqr and Sons, Inc., 1965), 291.

15
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Germany throughout July and early August 1914. This act was reciprocated by most other
socialist movements throughout Europe. For the SPD, defense of Germany was
synonymous with the defense of the German workingclass. Supporting the homeland was
the ecpedient way of preserving all the gains of German social-democracy: socialist
representation in the Reichstag, rights to hold elections, protection of trade-unions, and
Idolization of the Party. To do anything less than answer the call to duty would be to
undermine all the SPD had accomplished during the past forty years. The German
Socialists accepted a “civil peace,” or Burgfrieden: “the voluntary suspension by the political
parties of all strug^e among themselves and against the government.”

For no other

political party in Germany was there such a rapid change in strategy than within the SPD.
Once the German Social-Democratic Party accepted this new position, the leaders of the
labor movement had to adapt their role. Disciplining the labor movement now became the
primary function of party leaders in Germany. It was the essence of the party’s new
position, the historian Carl Schorske argues, “that any basic opposition to its policy was
ipso facto an attack on the national war effort and the state, and vice versa.”
Paradoxically, Schorske concludes, it was this discipline that became a major factor in the
split that would wrack European social-democracy during the Great War. “
Very few socialist movements rejected the rally-cry from their national governments
during the first days of August 1914. One group that did rebuff this call to arms was the
Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). A particular element of this party—the
Bolsheviks—not only rejected “defensism,” but promulgated the defeat of the tsarist
Ibid, 292.
” lbid,294.
20
Ibid, 295.
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government as their top priority. In a pamphlet written in the summer of 1915, Lenin
stated that revolutionary action during a time of war encompassed one task only—the
defeat of one’s own govemmoiL

This meant not only wishing for the defeat of one’s

own government, but also facilitating the process by inciting revolution against that
government “Revolution in wartime means civil war,” Lenin stated in 1915.

Led by

Lenin, the Bolsheviks advocated international prolaarian revolution. The Bolsheviks
believed only international revolution could destroy the bourgeoisie’s grip on the working
classes.
Class solidarity was essential for Marxist revolution. According to Marxist theory, states
are not autonomous, self-determined entities; rather, they are a conglomeration of
economic forces. From the late nineteenth to the twentieth century, these states were
economic forces based on capitalism. W hile they competed and vied with each other for
foreign markets, they also buttressed each other’s power by preserving the status quo of
capitalist domination. To Marxists these economic forces enslaved the capitalist system’s
workers—the proletariat For each worker, then, his own government was just as hostile as a
foreign bourgeois government The proletariat had no homeland; all they had was the
fraternal alliance of all workers worldwide. Their common subjugation and oppression
fused them together. And it was only through their solidarity that the yoke of capitalism
could be lifted. Marx, in 1872, declared that only “when we have established [solidarity] on

V.I. Lœm, Collected Works o f Lemn, 45 vois. (London: Lawrence and Wiriuut, 1960-1970) “The Defeat
of One’s Omi Government in the Imperialist W a r v o l . XXL 7/26/15,275. This source will hereinafter be
referred to as Lenin, C ^.
“ Ibid, 276.
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a sound basis among the numerous workers of all countries will we attain the great final
goal [.]” “
It was this solidarity that the Bolsheviks called for at the outbreak of the Great War.
More than a year before the beginning of hostilities, Lenin wrote that the “one guarantee
of peace is the organized, ccmscious movement of the working class.”

For the Bolsheviks,

the first enemy was one’s own government. Defeat of that government was the necessary
prerequisite for international revolution.

“ Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, quoting Marx, ‘Tossibility of Non-violent Revcriution,” 9/8/72,524.
“The Bouigeoiâe and Peace,” Lenin, CW: vol. X K , 5/7/13,84.
18

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IL

“THE TRUE MEANING OF THE WAR”
The Bolshevik approach to international affairs was influenced significantly by this
debacle of internationalism in August 1914. “ The Bolsheviks were disappointed at the
new« that the SPD and all other socialist parties in the belligerent states had adopted a
defensist posture toward the war. To Lenin and his comrades, this choice was nothing
short of traitorous. The most influential socialist leaders of present-day Europe, Lenin
stated in October 1914, “hold views that are chauvinist, bourgeois and liberal, and in no
way socialist. The responsibility for this disgracing socialism falls primarily on the German
Social-Democrats.” “ “If there is anything than can hinder the revolutionary strug^e of
Russia’s working class against tsarism,” Lenin continues, “then that is the behavior of the
German and the Austrian Social-Democratic leaders [.]”
The RSDLP had always looked to the sociaWemocrats of Germany as the shining
example of socialism. The SPD was the inheritor of Marxist tradition, Germany had the
most class-conscious workers of all nations, and the German Social-Democratic Party
seemed the best-prepared body to lead the proletarian revolution Marx deemed inevitable.
Therefore, many socialists believed Germany would be the birthplace of international
revolution. Lenin agreed. Since the SPD was the premier social-democratic party, Germany
“ Nation, Blade Earth, Red Star, 4.
“ “The War and Russian Sccial^Democracy,” Lenin, CW\ vol. XXI,1(V11/14,29.
^ Ibid, 30.
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would spawn a workers’ revolution. German Social-Democracy, however, failed to fulfill its
historical role; the foundation for European socialism crumbled. “The national principle,”
Nation states, “had triumphed, and socialist internationalism proved a chimera when put
to the test.” “ A different political party would have to pick up the abandcmed banner of
socialist revolution.
In addition to the Great W ar experience, Lenin’s famous treatise. Imperialism, The
HigJiest Stage of Capitalism,^ provided another foundation for Bolshevik foreign policy. This
work converted Marxist revolution from a strictly economic phenomenon to a political
one. Economic alienation of the workingclasses was no longer the sole precondition for
socialist revolution. Lenin asserted that political rupture was just as capable of unleashing
proletarian uprising. According to Jon Jacobsen, it was Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism in
this work that placed “distinct national societies and global relationships alongside class
conflict within advanced capitalist countries at the core of revolutionary theory.”
Instead of a battle between states, Lenin viewed the Great W ar as fight for economic
sovereignty. Rather than a war for defense of the homeland against forces of evil, it was a
war of domination and conquest Imperialism described capitalism’s insatiable appetite for
expanding wealth, which necessitated the search for new markets. Lenin explained the
colonization of extra-European peoples and territories by European powers as an inevitable
consequence of this search for markets. Capitalism, Lenin stated, reaches the height of
imperialism when foreign markets and foreign peoples are dominated by European

“ Nation, Blade Earth, Red Star, 3.
^ Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics, 12.
^ Jacobson, When Hk Soviet Union Entered World Politics, 12.
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capitalism, and when antagonism characterized the nature of class relationships between
the bourgeoisie and proletariat back in Europe.
The sources of wealth exploited by European capitalism were are not infinite. Tensions
would build among the capitalist governments as their spheres of influence and routes of
trade began to contrasect “In the Leninist view,” Teddy Uldricks argues, “capitalism was
not a monolithic entity but rathw the bourgeoisie divided against itself by its own greed.”
These tensions transform into outright hostility, Lenin argued, as the capitalist states try to
preserve their economic hegemony. Lenin believed war was the only result of this friction.
The Great War, therefore, was the manifestation of the hostilities building among the
European states over the past half-century. It was a war for markets, a war of competition,
a war for economic domination.
According to Lenin, these imperialist belligerents drafted workers to fight their wars of
conquest. Patriotism and nationalism were techniques by which the European proletariat
were tricked into fighting for the expansion of capitalism. Bourgeois phrases of patriotism
and national defense shattered the international fraternity of workers by convincing them
that the war was a noble cause, and that their governments were worth defending. Lenin
stated that the “sole actual content, importance and significance of the present war” lay in
distracting the attention of the working masses from the political crises in the belligerent
states, “disuniting and nationalist stultification” of the workers, and exterminating their
vanguard so as to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

“The

bourgeoisie of each country,” Lenin believed, “is trying, with the help of false phrases about

\M ndks, Diplonuxy and Ideology, 148.
“The War and Russian Sodal-Democracy.” Lenin, CW\ vol. XXL 10/11/14,27.
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patriotism, to extol the significance of its ‘own’ national war, asserting that it is out to
defeat the enemy [.]”
The Bolsheviks considered it their duty to expose this bourgeois deception of workers.
Socialists still loyal to internationalism had a responsibility to foster civil war worldwide. “It
is primarily on Social-Democracy,” Lenin states, “that the duty rests of revealing the true
meaning of the war.” ^ Otherwise, "without a decisive break with opportunism, and
without explaining its inevitable fiasco to the masses,” Lenin warned, the aims of socialism
cannot be fulfilled.
The fiercest enemy in this struggle to turn world war into civil war was the defensist
capitulators. Viewing the Great W ar as a war of imperialism, Lenin could not fathom the
SPD’s submission to defensism. “The gravest feature of the present crisis,” Lenin stated in
November 1914, “is that the majority of official representatives of European socialism have
succumbed to bourgeois nationalism land] chauvinism.” “ Why enlist workers, Lenin
asked, for defense of a government which was striving to maintain the very socio-economic
structure that oppresses them? By accepting calls to patriotism, Lenin argued, all socialdemocrats of the belligerent states have failed their workingclass constituencies. For Lenin
and the Bolsheviks, stifling the progress of socialism was worse than the wealth-mongering
capitalists who sent workers to kill each other in the trenches.

“The War and Russian Social-Democracy.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXI, 11/1/14,28-9.
^ Ibid., 27.
“ ibid., 32.
“ “The Position and Tasks of the Socialist Intanadonal,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXL 11/1/14,35.
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CHAPTER III.

“POLITICS BY DIFFERENT MEANS”
As early as 1915, the belligerent nations began exchanging overtures for peace to each
other. Depravation on homefronts, growing social discontent, and stalemate on the
warffonts made European leaders consider an end to hostilities. Proponents of peace had
raised their voices increasingly as the war progressed through 1916. Years of total war had
resulted in deadlock, and it became increasingly difficult to justify the deaths of so many.
Many viewed the war as an unfortunate consequence of arms buildup during the early
portion of the century. Disarmament was seen as a way to end wars permanently.
Diplomats for the belligerents sought peace, yet they could not reach agreement on the
safeguarding of colonies and the annexations of foreign territories.
For Lenin and the Bolsheviks the call for peace was nonsensical. The Bolsheviks saw
the bourgeoisie practicing “politics by different means” th ro u ^ these cries for peace and
disarmament. According to Lenin, suing for peace was the latest bourgeois tactic for
maintaining their oppressive hold over the workingclasses. Lenin understood the war as a
continuation “by violent means” of politics pursued by the ruling classes of the belligerent
powers. He wrote that “peace is a continuation of the very same politics. . . war does not
alter the direction of prewar politics, but only accelerates their development.”

Calls for

disarmament were simply pacifist drivel that benefited only the bourgeoisie. Just as calls for
“ “The Peace Programme,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXII, 3/25/16,163. |Enq*asis Lenin’s]
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national defense were used to dupe the working classes, so “phrases about a democratic
peace smuggle in the very same bourgeois lie.” “ W ithout a series of revolutions and a
revolutionary struggle in every country against the respective government, it was impossible
to hope fcHT“anything resembling a democratic peace.” ^ Only by turning the national war
(war between political states) into an international war could a truly lasting peace come to
Europe; only civil war in all belligerent countries could ignite an international revolution.
By 1916, Lenin began to reconsider his position on peace. He believed that the
dragging out of war seriously endangered the possibility of proletarian revolution in Russia.
“Therefore,” Lenin stated, “the revolutionary forces of Russia. . . set themselves the urgent
task of ending the war as quickly as possible I.]” ^ Convinced that the schism between
defensists and defeatists would never be mended, believing the war was swallowingup
working men by the hundred thousands and literally killing any form of fraternal alliance
among European workers, Lenin revised his original stance on peace.
Lenin did not seek a peace for peace’s sake. He still spumed the pacifist pleas for
disarmament, and still detested a peace with annexations. Lenin did not believe the war
could only be ended by a simple “refusal” of individuals, groups, or “casual crowds.” The
war could be ended by revolution alone: “We are for the war being ended by a revolution
in a number of countries, i.e., by the conquest of state power by a new class . . . by the
[proletariat].”

Lenin viewed peace as a chance to consolidate proletarian forces, for three

reasons. First, peace would end the suffering of the proletarian masses. According to a

“ Ibid., 164. PEnqAasis Lenin’s]
“ Ibid., 294.(Enq)hasis Lenin’s]
Ts There a Way to a Just Peacer Lenin, CW: vol. XXVn, 6/20(7)/17,55.
CW, vol. 24: The Significance of Fraternization,’ 5/Il(4/28)/I7,319-20.
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“decree of peace" passed by the Bolsheviks, an overwhelming majority of the workers and
laboring classes of all belligerent countries were “exhausted, tormented, and racked by
war,” and longed for a “just and democratic peace.”

The senseless slaughter of Lenin’s

socialist constituency had to end. Second, peace would break the seal on social discontent
and undermine the economic gains of the imperialist belligerents. “The capitalists fear
peace,” Lenin argued, “because they know they will have to render an account to their
people. They are trying to postpone the hour of their final bankruptcy.”

Third, Lenin

believed peace would—after a respite for consolidation of the masses—provide the
opportunity of instilling classconsciousness into the proletariat.
The February Revolution of 1917 left the issue o f peace unresolved. Substantial
political gains, however, were accomplished by the new Provisional Government Three
hundred years of autocratic rule ended in Russia when Tsar Nicholas II abdicated his
thrown on 2 March. Also, the new government—comprised of Constitutional Democrats
(Kadets), moderate socialists, and radical socialists like the Mensheviks—proclaimed the
inviolability of basic civil liberties, the end of political censorship, and an amnesty for
political and religious prisoners. ^ It also guaranteed freedom to join workers’ unions and
to strike, and provided the right of all Russian citizens to participate in the planned
elections for a Constituent Assembly.

However, the issue of peace went unsolved.

Moderate and liberal groups in the Provisional Government wanted to continue the war
Jane Degras, ed, Soviet Documents <m Foreign Polity (New York; Octagon Bodrs, 1978) “Decree of
Peace, passed by tiré 2d. All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Dgruties.”
Vol. 1,11/8/17,1. This source will hoeinaAerbe referred to as Degras, Soviet Docs.
“Ajréeal fiom the Perale s (Commissariat for Foreign Affeiis to the toiling, oppressed, and exhausted
TCoples of Europe.” Degras, Soviet Docs.: vol. 1 ,12/19/17,20.
JoMM.ThompS(m,RevolutionaryRu5sia, I9I7, Second Ed., (New York: Macmillan Putdishing (Co.,
1989), 33.
“ Ibid.
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against German militarism. The Mensheviks were the most outspoken supporters of war
from the radical left. They believed it was the only way to protect the democratic gains of
the February Revolution. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, remained adamantly against
the continuation of war. Immediate peace was viewed as the only path available to prepare
Russia for a proletarian revolution
The Bolsheviks gained power in October 1917 in large part through their promise for
“land, bread, and peace.” Getting Russia out of the war was a major part of the Bolshevik
platform. Lenin and his comrades understood that peace was essential for the Bolsheviks to
maintain power. And their call for peace extended beyond Russian borders. An appeal
from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs declared that only after the imperialist
war ended, could the “working class in all lands . . . overthrow the rule of capital and . . .
seize political power in order to reconstruct Europe and the whole world on democratic
and socialist lines.” “ In a note to all the neutral countries of Europe, Leon Trotsky
declared that the “demand for an immediate peace is . . . the demand of the mass of the
people of all countries, belligerent or neutral. The Soviet government firmly counts . . . on
finding the most resolute support in its struggle for peace among the [laboring] masses of
the neutral countries [.]”

By appealing to all the “oppressed” and “toiling” peoples of

Europe, the Bolsheviks hoped to incite international revolution through peace. Much as
they had attempted to inflame workers into turning their arms against the bourgeoisie,
now the leaders of Revolutionary Russia sought to ignite revolution through the laying-

“
fiom the Pe(q>le’s Commissariat for Foreign Affeirs to the toiling, oppressed, and exhausted
peoples of Eurtq».” Degras, Soviet Docs.: vol. 1,12/19/17,19.
^ “Note fiom Trotdg, Pe(q>les Commissar for Foreign AfiEairs, to the representatives of N orw^, the
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, DemnaA, and Sweden on the opening of Peace Negotiations,” Ibid.,
11/23/17,10.
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down of arms. Peace would produce workingclass solidarity; peace would expose the
grievous capitalist oppression of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks, then, extended highsounding overtures for peace without “indemnities” and “annexations.” It was going to be
a peace for the people—the working people (the only constituency that mattered). The new
revolutionary government, Soviet Russia, appealed to the belligerent states to immediately
engage in talks for peace.
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CHAPTER IV.

“THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF REVOLUTIONS”
The October Revolution was a seismic shift in European history, and the Bolsheviks
viewed it as such. By taking the reins of power and adopting the gains of the February
Revolution, the Bolsheviks considered themselves the harbingers of a new world order. But
the Bolsheviks did not consider their revolution an anomaly. The October Revolution was
viewed in the materialist streamline of history, as promulgated by Karl Marx. According to
the Bolsheviks, the Russian Revolution was the first spark of a socialist uprising that would
ignite all of Europe. The Bolsheviks believed workers of other European states would
follow their lead and seize state power from the bourgeoisie. The October Revolution, a
Party statement proclaimed, is “the first in a series of revolutions and uprisings by the
proletariat which the imperialist war will inevitably engender [.]” ^ The statement declared
that the Bolsheviks were obligated to call on all the proletarian masses “to rise up against
their own governments and thus support the revolutionary movement in Russia [.]” ^ The
Bolshevik precedent would guide the way for international class war. “The example of the
Russian workers,” Lenin stated, “will be followed inevitably, perhaps not tomorrow

Ralph C Elwood and Ridhaid Gregor, eds. Resolutions and Deasions o f the Comnmnist Party o f the
Soviet Union (Tmonto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), “On War and Peace,” vol. 1,3/22/17,205.
This source will hereinafter be referred to as CP5U.
“ Ibid.
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(revolutions are not made to order), but inevitably all the same by the workers and all the
working peoples [.]”
For Marx and Engels, revolution was the herald of change. The radical adjustment in
socio-economic class relations redirected the course of history. The French Revolution,
according to Marx and &igels, was the first revolution of modem history. Feudalism was
destroyed; the capitalist phase of history begun. “The bourgeoisie broke up the feudal
system,” Engels stated in 1880, “and built upon its ruins the capitalist order of society.”
Class relationships became more defined as bourgeois industrialists superceded the feudal
landlords. Tillers of landed estates were transformed into workers under the employ of
wealthy industrialists. The French Revolution brought the realization of socialism one step
closer. Less than one hundred years later in 1871, and also occurring in France, the Paris
Commune signaled the inception of Marx’s last historical epoch—socialism. Despite its
failure, Marx viewed the Commune as a precursor to the international socialist revolution.
The Bolsheviks, then, believed their revolution was completing Marx’s historical
prophecy. The foundation for their revolution’s success was the French Revolution and the
Paris Commune. According to Dmitry Shlapentokh, many Russian intellectuals not only
assumed the October Revolution was similar to that of the French in its political and social
outlines, but also concluded that the Russian Revolution was a “carbon copy” of the events
in France. ” Many Russian intellectuals were filled with a “messianic fervor,” Shlapentokh
states. “These intellectuals believed that Russia should adopt certain ideas (e.g., freedom.
“ Ts Thae a Way to a Just Peacer Lenin, CW: vol. XXVn, 6/20(7yi7,56.
Tucka, Marx-Engels Reader, quoting Engels, “Socialism: Utqpian and Scientific,” 1880,701.
Dmitiy Shhqientokh, “The French Revolution in Russian intellectual life, 1789-1922,” in The Global
Ramifications o f the French Revolution, Josq>h Klaits and Michael H, Haltzehn eds. (Carhbiidge,
Camtaidge University Press, 1994), 84. This source will heretofore be referred to as “French Revolution in
Russian Life.”
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equality, and brotherhood) that Europe had begotten but had abandoned long before.”
Lenin described a likeness between the Jacobin and Bolshevik Revolutions. Like the
Jacobins, the Bolsheviks had declared war on “‘the allied tyrants directed against the
Republic.’” ^ According to Lenin, the Jacobins were a “great historical «cample of a truly
revolutionary struggle against the doss of the exploiters by the class of the working people and the
oppressed [.]” “ Shlapentokh states that Russian revolutionaries were fascinated with the

French Revolution, which provided an operational model. “Those who advocated
spontaneous, grass-roots movements praised the French Revolution as the example of
spontaneous popular action.” “
Lessons from the Paris Commune were particularly important to the Bolsheviks. Since
the Paris uprising was the first proletarian revolution to affect a modem European nation,
the Bolsheviks emulated much of the spirit and action of the Paris Commune. For many
Bolsheviks, their revolution was simply an extension of the Commune’s legacy and also a
corrective to its mistakes. According to Robert Tombs, Marxists saw the Paris Commune as
a revolutionary “prototype” to be examined and diagnosed in order to produce a successful
future model.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not consider the failure of the Commune

inevitable; instead they believed it was the result of strategic mistakes. Whereas socialist
critics like Karl Kautsky believed the Commune failed by taking power prematurely, the
Bolsheviks believed failure was due to the pursuit of “contradictory tasks”—both patriotism

“ Ibid.
“ “The Enemies of the People,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXV, 6/20(7)/17,57.
Ibid., 58. [Emphasis Lenin’s]
“ Shlapentddi, “French Revolution in Russian Life,” 77.
“ Robert Tombs, The Paris Commune, 1871 (London and New York, Longman Publishers, 1999), 199.
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and socialism. “ The Communards, the Bolsheviks argued, should have thrown off all
bourgeois phrases of patriotism and turned their struggle into a class war.
The proletarian revolution that would implement Marx’s materialist conception of
history, however, was not supposed to happen in an agrarian state like Russia. Over 80
percent of the population was landed peasantry. The only industrial infrastructure to speak
of was based in two cities, Moscow and Petrograd. Compared with Germany, Russia’s
workingclass population was miniscule. And the RSDLP was an illegal party, which had
emigrated throughout Europe during most of the war to avoid tsarist authority. The spark
for international revolution was supposed to occur in Germany. That country was the most
industrialized state in Europe; it had the largest workingclass of any other country, and it
possessed the most graduated political representation in the SPD. Marx predicted that only
a state with a highly-industrialized infrastructure could foster the ignition of a proletarian
revolution. Why then did Russia become the locomotive of Marxist revolution?
Lenin believed Russia’s significance lay in its “backwardness.” Its antiquated form of
Oriental despotism, feudal standard of agrarian economics, infantile development of
capitalism, and its inefficient enforcement of centralized power all made the waging of
revolution in Russia “simple.” For Lenin this was an alternative route to the same
destination. While classconflict developed in the more industrialized states of Europe,
proletarian revolution could rest on the foundation of Soviet Russia. This was the
innovated interpretation of Marxism that the Bolsheviks adopted. For them, the alteration
was precluded by German Social-Democratic defensism. The SPD had forfeited its Marxian
mandate for revolution by voting for war credits. W ith their vote for war, their
“ Ibid., 200.
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responsibility for proletarian uprising crumbled. A new basis, a new representative was
needed.
The Bolsheviks believed they were the ones to fulfill this role. Throughout years of war,
they had remained faithful to international revolution, and had rejected the taint of
bourgeois defensism that infected so many of their socialist colleagues throughout Europe.
The Bolsheviks, as early as 1915, postulated themselves as the vanguard of European
socialism. “O ur Party,” Lenin declared in September of that year, “will preserve the slogan
of ‘transform the imperialist war into a civil war,’ i.e., the slogan of the socialist revolution
in the West.” ” In that same m onth Lenin boldly claimed that Russia would serve as a
conduit of international socialist revolution. “ Two years later, the Bolsheviks made good
on their claim by establishing the first proletarian-led government since the Paris
Commune. In the

Rrst Mani^sto of 1918, the Party declared that Russia had set an

example of power for all working classes, and that her example would be followed by all
other countries. “Our example will create enthusiasm, the will for effort, and the
determination to win victory over the enemies in the hearts of all workmen of the world.”**
Marx’s conception of history-with its inception in Paris of 1789 and its dénouement in
Petrograd of 1917—was now complete. The overthrow of absolutism and feudalism was the
“chief content” of the period between 1789 and 1871. “The period of 1789-1871 left
behind it deep marks and revolutionary memories,” Lenin stated. “There could be no

“ “The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionaiy Crisis.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXL 9/15,381
'^Through the defeat o f Russia, towards a revolution in Russia and, through that revolution and in
coruKction with it, towards a civil war in Europe^ in “The Defeat of Russian and the Revolutionaiy
Crisis.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXI, 9/15,382.
** Rex Wade, ed.. Documents o f Soviet History. (Gulf Breeze, Academic International Press, 1991-95),
“May First Mamfesto.” Vol. L 5/1/18,152. This source will hereinafter be referred to as Wade, Documents
o f Soviet History.
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development of the proletarian struggle for socialism prior to the overthrow of feudalism
[and] absolutism [.]” “ Lenin further tied the 1905 Russian Revolution within to
revolutionary legacy of France. “The imperialist war [has] linked up the Russian
revolutionary crisis, which stems from a bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the growing
crisis of the proletarian socialist revolution in the W est

The Russian bourgeois-

democratic revolution [of 1905] is now not only a prologue to, but an indivisible and
integral part of, the socialist revolution in the West.” “ According to Lenin, the 1905
revolution consummated the bourgeois revolution in Russia, The 1905 experience also
presented Russia as European, and not much different from the West. The Revolution of
1905, Shlapentokh argues, was the first Russian revolution of the European type. It
demonstrated that Russia, though it lagged behind in fixing its problems, solved socio
political tensions according to the Western model. Consequently, Shlapentokh states, the
French Revolution and Paris Commune were “not only relevant to Russia, but became the
most popular subject in discussions among those who espoused the idea of a basic
similarity between Russia and the West.” ** Now, in 1917, the urgent task lay in
broadening proletarian revolution in Russia into international proletarian revolution in
Europe. “

“
“
^
“

“Socialism and War,” Lenin, OF: vol. XXL 7-8/15,300
“The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXL 9/15,379.
Shlapentokh, “French Revolution in Russian Life,” 79.
Ibid.
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CHAPTER V.

“PEREDYSHKA A ‘BREATHING SPELL’”
By December 1917, it became clear to the Bolsheviks that their call for peace would
only extend as far as Germany. Europe’s working classes did not rise up to support
Revolutionary Russia. Soldiers on the front did not turn their arms against their bourgeois
overlords. The pitiful war continued. The governments of Great Britain and France felt
betrayed by their Russian ally. As far as they were concerned, a Bolshevik refusal to
continue the war effort left them to bear the full brunt of German steel upon the Western
Front. Germany, on the other hand, was happy to conduct peace negotiations. But not to
the degree of conceding their massive gains in the East. Why setde for a “peace without
annexations” when a final offensive push would end the war in the East anyway? And
negotiations with Germany would not be conducted through representative of the
German working-class (as the Bolsheviks had hoped), but instead via the German military
machine.
Even before reaching the negotiating table, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were in an
unfortunate position. German troops had all but defeated the Russians on the Eastern
Front The Central Powers had nothing to lose and everything to gain in formulating a
peace with Soviet Russia. Peace on the Eastern Front would allow the transfer of German
regiments to the West, and the destabilized Soviet Republic would be hard-pressed to re-
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occupy the vast tracts of land annexed by Germany. So when talks began at Brest-Litovsk
on 22 December 1917, the Germans rejected at the Bolshevik demand for “peace without
annexations.” ** According to Jchn Wheeler-Bennett, it mattered little to the Bolsheviks if
the Germans gained further sources of territorial and material strength (i.e. the Bolshevik
delegation was unconcerned about maintaining the prewar borders of the former tsarist
empire).*^ W hat did matter was the struggle of the Eastern European proletariat. Ceding
vast tracts of territory to Germany would be the same as surrendering workingclass
constituencies to imperial-capitalist enemies. “The battle-ground was that of social
struggle,” Wheeler-Bennett states, “and therein frontiers mattered little in comparison with
the fight of the proletarian against the capitalist.” “ Soviet Russia, however, was in no
shape to enforce a peace without annexations. Its army was in shambles and German
troops physically occupied much of the land concerned in the conference. “The socialist
government of Russia is faced,” Lenin wrote in early January 1918, “with the questions . . .
of whether to accept this peace with annexations now, or to immediately wage a
revolutionary war.”

“ John Wheeler-Bennett illuminates exoellentty the diametrical difference between the negotiating parties
at Brest-Litovsk. “No two groiq» could have thought more differentty. The Central Powers qx*e the
ancient language of diplomacy, timehonored [sic] and crusted with tradition Thqr thought in terms of
strat^ic lines, of {Hovinces ceded, of ecoiKHnic advmitages to be gained. N<Mso the Bolsheviks. Theirs was
not a pariance of fiontieis and concessions. This was the first ccmtact of Bolshevism with the Western
World, and it was the aim of the Soviet rqpresadatives to utilize the meeting as a sounding-board for the
propagation of their doctrine. In their principles of a general Eurqtean peace they were not coimemed with
ge%raphical terms and eqmessions. They banked iqxxt the immediate effect oftheiriHq)aganda<m the
war-weary masses of Eunqte to achieve . . . the World Revolution and the rqdacmnent of Inqrerialism by
‘rule of the proletariat’” John Wheeler-Bennett. Brest-Litavdi: The Forgdten Peace, Mardi 1918. (New
York: W.W. Norton & Ckmqxuty, Inc., 1938), 115.
“ Wheeler-Benrtett, BresZ-LirovsA; 116.
“ ibid.
® “On the History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVI, l/7(20)/18,444.
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The Bolshevik delegation, led by Leon Trotsky, remained resolute until negotiations
cooled in late January and early February. Many Bolsheviks believed acceptance of such a
peace, which equaled the loss of a third of the former empire, would discredit their claim
to power. On 10 February, Trotsky boldly—and somewhat naively—proclaimed to the
conference what became known as “No War, No Peace.” According to this document
Soviet Russia, due to German intransigence, discontinued hostilities but refused to accept
officially a dictatorial peace. “We cannot,” Trotsky decreed, “enter the signature of the
Russian Revolution under conditions which carry oppression, sorrow, and suffering to
millions of human beings!.]” ™The Bolsheviks would simply quit the scene.
An obviously unusual form of diplomacy, Trotsky’s proclamation was an attempt to
conciliate rivaling stances on peace among the Bolsheviks. “No War, No Peace” was to
serve as a compromise between those Bolsheviks who demanded a revolutionary war, and
those Bolsheviks who called for a “breathing spell” through peace. Neither faction was
satisfied. Those advocating war—angry that Soviet Russia was negotiating with German
jingoists in the first place-believed Trotsky was displaying an irresoluteness that would
undercut the revolutionary mandate of the party. Advocates for peace believed Trotsky’s
action eliminated any hope for an acceptable peace, and feared the resurgence of
hostilities.

™James Banyan and H.H. Fisher, eds. The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918: Documents and Materials.
(Stanford University Press, Stanford), “No War and No Peace,” 2/10/18,510. This source will hereinafter
be referred to as Bimyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution.
W keler-Bennat describes the scene after Trotslty finished his diatribe. “When the last echoes of
Trotdty's powerful voice died away, no one spoke. The whole conference sat speechless, dumbfounded
before the audacity of this coup de theatre. The amazed silence was shattered by an ejaculation fix>m
(Major General fat German forces on the Eastern Front Max] Hoffinan: 'Unerhord' (‘Unheard oft')[.]”
Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, 227.
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This was the dilemma faced by the Bolsheviks when negotiations with Germany
reached an impasse in early 1918. To continue the revolution unabated or delay with the
hope that peace would provide leverage for international revolution? Revolutionary
determination formulated the Bolshevik stance on foreign diplomacy prior to 1917.
Foreign relations were consequential only in their relation to international revolution.
Marxist doctrine had never been explicit about a revolutionary form of diplomacy.
Diplomacy was comprised of overthrowing the system of bourgeois states, the very
institutions that practiced foreign relations. So when the proletarian masses failed to
respond to the call for revolution, the Bolsheviks had to improvise. W ould they become
statesmen or remain revolutionary idealists? Initially, peace was not an unacceptably tactic
for the Bolsheviks. Their revolutionary sentiments were not violated because the layingdown of arms was viewed as an alternate road to the ultimate goal of international
revolution (all discussed above). Lenin and the Bolsheviks were sure the proletarian masses
would come to aid their revolution. But the revolution(s) did not come. The Bolsheviks
faced a dilemma. They were the first proletarian government since the Paris Commune,
and they—as guarantors of Marxist dialectics—possessed the revolutionary mandate. The
Bolsheviks, however, also found themselves the administrators of a crumbling state power
on the brink of chaos. Civilians on the homefront were starving because of poor food
distribution, and mutinous soldiers were too weary to be organized. For many Bolsheviks,
this was a prime opportunity to complete the revolution in Russia. The state was
crumbling, the bourgeoisie was scattered, and the workers were in power. To less idyllic
observers like Lenin the situation was more precarious. First, Bolshevik power rested on
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the promise for peace and not much else. Rescinding this promise could undermine their
standing (and all their revolutionary goals) and provide impetus for another coup d ’etat hy
one of their many enemies. Second, and most important, promulgating a peace program
would insinuate a defensist mode of foreign diplomacy. Revolutionary goals of the party
would be compromised by obligations to state defense.
Lenin did not believe he would be stifling his revolutionary endeavors by adopting a
“defensist” form of diplomacy. He understood that the condition of the revolution would
need revision, yet he believed this delay was necessary. W ith the revolution relegated to one
country, bourgeois belligerents would easily extinguish all Bolshevik gains. Suing for peace,
Lenin reasoned, would provide peredyshka (a “breathing spell”) during which Soviet Russia
could strengthen its revolutionary power. Credibility for the regime could also be gained by
displaying temperance. A firm basis in Russia would provide a foundation for revolution in
the rest of Europe.
While the Party debated the best course, the German military brought the matter to a
head. W ith the armistice expired, and after Trotsky’s ine3q)licable denouement of
negotiations, German troops were ordered on 17 February to advance towards Petrograd.
In a matter of 24 hours German troops covered 150 miles over practically non-existent
roads and in the face of the Russian winter, capturing over two thousand guns, many
thousands of prisoners, and a “goodly haul” of motorcars, locomotives, and trucks. ” Lenin
recognized it was time for a decision. “The worst, the very worst, had happened,” Wheeler-

^^Wbeeler-Bamett, Brest-Litovsk, 245.
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Bennett declares. “All that [Lenin] had dreaded and warned against had come true. There
was no more time for talking.”
The Bolshevik formal acceptance of peace reached Berlin on the 21 February; two days
later the Germans replied with new and harsher terms presented in the form of an
ultimatum.^^ On the 24 February the Bolsheviks accepted German terms and finally, on
the 26*, the German advance (which had reached Lake Peipus and Narva) was halted and
the Bolsheviks were directed to send to Brest-Litovsk a delegation authorized to sign a
peace. ” Georgi Chicherin replaced Trotsky as head of the Bolshevik d e la tio n , and the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918. By this agreement Russia lost 34
percent of its population, 32 percent of its agricultural lands, 54 percent of its industrial
complex, and 89 percent of its coal mines. Germany had won the war on the Eastern
Front. “The Revolution had placed the achievement of peace at the head of [Bolshevik]
ambitions,” Wheeler-Bennett concludes, “and now at last peace had been achieved—a peace
that passed all understanding.”
In a statement to the German delegation after the signing of the Peace, the Russian
delegation declared that the “peace by agreement” was in fact an imperialistic peace—“a

“ Ibid., 257.
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid., 246.
“ According to Adam Ulam, Biest-Litovric ended die age of innocence for the Bolsheviks. “[The
Bolsheviks] went into die negotiations as world levolutionaries; they emerged as men solicitous mainly
about dieir own state and power.” (Ulam, EjpmsioR and Coexittence, 75.) October marked the birth of die
Bolshevik Revolution, but the signing of the humiliating and cosdy Peace marked dm real beginning of the
Sovi^ state. (Ibid.) RC. Nation, however, believes the Bolsheviks still considoed world revolution to be
the Soviet régime s most important ally in its long-term confiontation with imperialian. (Natim, Blade
Earth, Red Seir, 14.)
“ Wheelor-Bermett, Brest-Litovsk, 269.
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peace dictated at the point of a gun.”

Under the circumstances, Soviet Russia had no

choice but to accept the peace since their state was in shambles and their defenses were
completely dilapidated. Despite their inability to resist a German armed offensive, the
Bolshevik delegation had “no doubt that the triumph of imperialism and militarism over
the international proletarian revolution” would prove to be “temporary and ephemeral.” ”
Lenin did not believe Bolshevik ideals were violated by the acceptance of the peace. He
remained convinced that Soviet Russia would pass from a period of surrender to a stage of
resurgence through a “great patriotic war.”

It would not be a national chauvinist war in

the bourgeois sense, but rather a patriotic war “for a socialist fatherland, for socialism as a
fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a contingent of the wcnrld army of socialism.” ®*

“ “Statement of the Russian Delegation (after signature of Brest-Litovsk treaty),” Buityan and Fisho*,
Bolshevik Revolution, 3/3/18,522.
“ Ibid., 523.
“The Canef Task of Our Day,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVH, 3/12/18,161-63.
"Ibid.
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CHAPTER VI.

“A RUTHLESS WAR AGAINST
REVOLUTIONARY PHRASES”
Although Lenin had managed to halt the German advance through expedient
diplomacy, his acceptance of the peace was very unpopular among his Bolshevik comrades.
W hen the peace came up for approval by the Central Executive Committee (CEO), it
became obvious that Lenin would have to convince his colleagues that peace was
imperative. Jeers and cries of “traitor” greeted Lenin as he rose to address the CEO on the
night of 23 February. “Let us beware of becoming the slaves to our own phrases,” Lenin
stated. “You must sign this shameful peace in order to save the world Revolution, in order
to hold fast to its most important, and at present, its only foothold—the Soviet Republic [.]”
According to Wheeler-Bennett, the CEC was “listening spellbound” to Lenin; all their
passionate phrases about revolutionary war had been silenced. Lenin continued his
pedagogic homily.
“You think that the path to the proletarian Revolution is strewn with roses? That we
will march from victory to victory with waving flags, to the strains of the 'Internationale'?
Then it would be easy to be a revolutionary! The Revolution is not a pleasure trip! The
path of revolution leads over thorns and briars. Wade up to the knees in filth, if need be.

“ Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Utovdc,, 260.
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crawling on our bellies through dirt and dung to Communism, then in this figfrt we will

winl.r"
After Lenin finished his speech, the CEC discussed the matter. At the end of nearly
three hours, a vote was called. The CEC voted to sign the peace by 116 to 85 with 26
abstentions. Although his argument had swayed enough delegates to gain peace, Lenin had
not captured the loyalty of his opponents, and he left the meeting hall amid shouts and
howls of “traitor,” “judas,” “you have betrayed your country!” “German spy.”
Many Bolsheviks believed the peace was a betrayal of Marx’s revolutionary directive.
Preservation of the revolution superceded preservation of the state in any form. If Soviet
Russia would initiate the revolutionary process, the proletarian masses of Europe were sure
to follow. As explicated in the Marxist principle (later expounded upon by Trotsky) of
“Permanent Revolution,” this was the only way to liberate the workingclasses. Nikolai
Bukharin and other “Left” Bolsheviks believed Lenin was selling the proletarian revolution
short By approving the peace, Bukharin and his followers argued, the “Right” was
subjugating the international revolution to German junkerdom. Soviet Russia’s conclusion
of the Peace with Germany, the Left Communists declared, “weakened the strength of the
international revolution and strengthened international imperialism.”

These critics also

asserted that the Peace was that it countermanded the revolutionary zeal of the
international workingclass, and undermined the premier party status of the Bolsheviks.
Attempts at diplomatic maneuverings could not inspire the European working classes since
these maneuvers, critics of the Peace argued, “demonstrate not the strength, but the
*^Ibid.
“ Ibid., 261
85
“The ‘Left-Wing’ Communists.” Wade, Documents o f Soviet History, vol. L 4/4/18,110.
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weakness of the revolution.” ** Left Social Revolutionaries and Left Bolsheviks
unanimously viewed the Peace as capitulation to the enemy, and they believed all workers
viewed it as such. Because Soviet Russia had been denied the right to fulfill its historical
role of initiating international revolution, the workers of the belligerent states would be
discouraged from answering the revolutionary call. Both of these sentiments found voice at
the 7* Bolshevik Party Congress, held less than a week after the Brest signing. According to
the Minority Resolution of the Congress, the Brest Treaty “nullifies the international
importance of the Russian Revolution, and converts the Soviet Republic into a tool of
imperialistic politics!.]”

Regarding a “breathing spell,” the Resolution continued, the

signing of the Peace “demoralizes the revolutionary will of the proletariat and retards the
development of the international revolution.” “ Lenin himself, the Left argued, had
curtailed the revolution and denied the realization of Marx’s materialist history.
Lenin, on the other hand, remained convinced that peace was the only way to preserve
the revolution in Russia. And since revolution in the belligerent countries failed to
materialize, he rejected expending the young revolution on a conflict the Bolsheviks were
sure to lose. “[I]t would be a very bad policy,” Lenin stated, “to risk the fate of the Socialist
Revolution on the chance that a revolution might break out in Germany by a certain date.
Such a policy would be adventurous ].]”

Unlike his war-mongering comrades, Lenin

appreciated Clausewitz’s famous axiom, “politics by different means.” Just as Clausewitz

“ Ibid., 109.
" “The 7* Bolshevik Paity Congress on Peace [Mmorily Resoluti<m for Revolutionaiy War],” Bunyan and
Fishes, Bolshevik Revolution, 3/8/18,528.
“ Ibid.
“ “Revolutionaiy War and Peace,” Ibid., 1/20/18,504.
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argued that war is the extension of a belligerent country’s political agenda, ^ Lenin
believed the Peace was an extension of Soviet Russia’s political agenda. As discussed above,
peace could be used to accomplish the revolutionary goals of the Bolsheviks. By granting
time for consolidation, organization and education, the workingclasses would be prepared
to start their revolution. More importantly, peace would provide a “breathing spell” during
which Soviet Russia could form a solid base for international revolution.
Lenin was acutely aware the international revolution would not soon materialize. He
understood that Soviet Russia would have to maintain the revolutionary precedent for
some time to come. “The position of the socialist revolution in Russia must form the basis
of any definition of the international tasks of our Soviet power, for the international
situation,” Lenin wrote, “is such that is it quite impossible to predict the outbreak of
revolution [.]”

W hile most Bolsheviks expected the proletarian uprising in a matter of

weeks or months, Lenin knew it could be years before such a revolution occurred.
Throughout the early months of 1918, Lenin considered any attempt to predict the
coming revolution as a “blind gamble.”

Therefore, Lenin argued that the party had to

adjust its tactics. Soviet Russia, he stated, must be prepared to make concessions. The
Bolsheviks must accept the despicable setbacks, such as the Peace. Adaptation became a key
component of Lenin’s overarching strategy for fomenting international revolution.

^ "Wars are . . . tlie expressions (vmamfestatioiis of policy itself. The subordinatiaa of the political point
of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War, it is the
intelligent &cul^, Waronly the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of
view to the poM ad is, therefore, the only foing which is possible
“War is an instrument of policy, it
must necessarily bear its diaracter, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features,
is therefore policy itselL whidi ta l^ iq> foe sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to
think accorfong to its own law.” Carl von Clausewitz, On Witv, 1832,405 & 410.
“On foe History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVI, l/7(20y18,443.
^ “Revolutionary War and Peace,” Bunyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution, 1/20/18,501.
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Addressing the 7* Party Congress days after the signing of the Brest Peace, Lenin stated
that “[we] must know how to retreat [.]” His further comments explicated fully his
diplomatic intentions regarding the Peace:
“We must know how to retreat. . . . If you cannot adjust yourself, if you cannot
bring yourself to crawl on your belly in the mud, you are no revolutionary, but a
chatterbox

[Pjeace is a way to gather strength

History suggests that peace is a

breathing space between w ars.. . . Every such revolutionary will justify us, will recognize
the acceptance of a shameful treaty as right, because it is in the interests of the
proletarian revolution and the revival of Russia
lines

We must leam to work along new

We shall not take the risk now, but we shall leam to work in difficult

conditions, with an unprecedentedly humiliating treaty. . . for such an historic crisis is
not resolved by one war or by one peace treaty.” ”
Lenin believed that the task of a truly revolutionary party was not its renunciation of all
compromises, but rather, “through all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain
true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of paving the way
for revolution and educating the mass of the people for victory in revolution.”

In its

conduct of foreign policy, therefore, Soviet Russia would display the greatest discretion and
restraint to avoid provoking counter-revolutionary reaction from the belligerent states. For
Lenin, only restraint and work to establish proletarian discipline could “protect Soviet
power at this moment, one of the most difficult and dangerous periods of transition.

” “Extracts firom Lenin’s q>eech to the 7^ Congress oftheRCP on the Biest-Litovsk Peace,” Degras,
Soviet Docs.: vol. 1,3/7/18,57-61.
^ “On Compromises,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXV, 9/19(6)/17,309.
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unavoidable owing to the delay of the revolution in the W est” ^ It was imperative that the
Bolsheviks change their revolutionary approach. The Bolsheviks, Lenin argued, now had to
adopt a “serious attitude” toward Soviet Russia’s defense. It was necessary to “declare a
ruthless war against revolutionary phrases about revolutionary war.” ^ The Bolsheviks had
to practice patience; for in this way only could the socialist revolution be maintained in
Russia.
Throughout this episode Lenin balanced political pragmatism with Marxist idealism.
Although unbridled revolution was a primary tenet of Marxism, Lenin also understood
that Marx held class solidarity as a necessary precondition for revolution. Marx assumed,
once the spark of revolution was lit, all of Europe would ignite into revolution. The
Bolsheviks, then, were theoretically correct to continue the war against Germany. But Marx
did not stipulate the proper course of action in the case that international revolution did
not materialize.
Marx and Engels did address the issue of the state. They argued that the state served a
purpose for the proletarian revolution. It was the centralized institution socialist
revolutionaries could use to eradicate bourgeois power. According to Engels, state
centralization was in direct harmony with the concept of revolution. “Revolution is
certainly the most authoritarian thing there is,” Engels argued. “It is the act whereby one
part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets,
and cannon [.]”

Marx deemed this coopting of boui^eois state power as the “dictatorship

of the proletariat” The proletariat could not simply overthrow the bourgeoisie one day
^ “Theses on the Present Political Situadcm,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVn, 5/12-13/18,364.
“A Painful but Necessary Lesson,” Ibid.: 2/25/18,64.
^ Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, quoting Engels, “On Authority,” 10/1872,733.
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and create a socialist way of life the next. Marx believed there had to be a transitory phase
between the inception and completion of revolution. In his Critique of the Gotha Program
Marx stated that between “capitalist and communist society lies the period of the
revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds also a political
transition period which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the
proletariat” ^ The dictatorship of the proletariat was this transitory period. After the

proletarian revolution had completely eradicated all elements of bourgeois influence and
power, Marx and Engels argued, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be obsolete; the
state would wither away. The state “renders itself unnecessary” as it becomes the
representative of the whole society, Engels stated. “As soon as there is no longer any social
class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule. . . [is] removed,” Engels declared,
“nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer
necessary. — The state is not ‘abolished.’ It dies o u t” ^ Class conflict would be absent
because there would be only one socio-economic class, and everyone would live according
to their needs in a socialist society.
Armed with this doctrinal weaponry, Lenin defended his call for peace. Peace would
preserve the Russian revolution to the benefit of all workers. Lenin, like the Left
Bolsheviks and Left SRs, believed the decision for peace was horrible and had global
ramifications for the workingclasses. Whereas his opponents accused him of extinguishing
the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, Lenin thought it would be more shameful to
follow blindly Marx’s doctrine of unbridled revolution without considering contemporary

“ Ibid., quoting Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” 5/1875.538. (EnqAasis Marx’s]
^ Ibid, quoting Engels, “Socialism; Uttqnan and Scientific,” 1880,713.

47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sociopolitical consequences.

The gains of the Russian Revolution would be uselessly

expended in an unwinnable war. “From the point of view of the defense of the fatherland,”
Lenin argued in late February 1918, “we have to conclude the most harsh, oppressive,
brutal, disgraceful peace—not in order to ‘capitulate’ to imperialism but in order to leam
and prepare to fight against imperialism in a serious and effective manner.”

Patience

and compromise were the order of the day. According to Lenin, the Party’s mission was the
“systematic, unrelenting, all-round building up of the country’s defense potential, selfdiscipline everywhere, [and] the use of grievous defeat to improve discipline in all spheres
of life for [consolidating] Soviet power.”

The goal of international revolution remained

tantamount, however, Lenin was not ready to carelessly sacrifice the revolution for which
he had spent decades preparing. Following blindly a strategy of unrestrained revolutionary
war would make it easier, Lenin argued, “for German imperialism to crush the Soviet
Republic [.]”

In the end, this outcome would hurt the international socialist movement

more than the acceptance of a grievous Peace ever could. If the socialist revolution were
extinguished in Russia, all hope for an international uprising would be eradicated

Commenting on Lenin’s sagacity, Richard Ddx> states that as a Marxist who w(mld have to justify his
pnqx)sals to other Marxists, Lenin devehqied his polices “within theoretical fiamewoik of dialectical
materialism, dass conflict, and the hoitage of the Eunq)ean and Russia revolutionary movements. Unlike
some of his colleagues, (Latin’s] Marxism was not a thin excrescence covering a {Ailos(q)hic void of a
dogmatism whidi ntindlessfy tied him to every work of his mentor. He used die worii: of Marx and Engels
as a guide tatiier than a detailed road m ^ and made special use of their nœthod of social-political anafysis
to constriKt his policies. As sudi, Marxism served him well, for throu^ it he identifled his adversaries,
analyzed their oonoeteintaests and plotted the political direction in which thqr were moving.” (Debo,
Revolution and Survival, 411.)
“A Painful but Necessary Lesson. ”Lenin, CW\ vol. XXVn, 2/25/18,64.
“Position of the Cmitral Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) on the Question of the Separate and
Armexationist Peace.” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVn, 2/26/18,60.
103 Ibid.
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permanently. “If we are not prepared to make fresh sacrifices and do not hold out,” Lenin
warned, “it will be said that our revolution was historically unjustified.”

104 “The Achievements and Difficulties of the Soviet Govenunent,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXIX, 3-4/19,68.

49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VIL

“DRAGGED AND SHOVED TO GOLGOTHA”
Many contemporary socialists responded negatively to the Bolsheviks and their
revolution, Maxim Gorky, a prominent Russian socialist, looked unfavorably upon the
Bolshevik revolution. He considered it an autocratic power comparable to the tsarist
example. The October Revolution “cast aside all the intellectual forces of democracy” that
had sprung to life after the February Revolution.*®® Gorky believed a successful socialist
revolution was untenable in Russia. It was impossible, Gorky states, “to make socialists out
of the eighty-five percent peasant population of the countryl.j” *“ For Gorky, the
Bolsheviks were making an “insane experiment of Russia.” He believed the working class—
“the vanguard of the revolution”—would suffer the most from this experim ent “The best
forces and hopes” for revolution would be “crushed and destroyed.”

Gorky also

attacked the Bolshevik ejq)lanation that Russian “backwardness” fertilized the seeds of
revolution. He feared the Bolshevik claim that Soviet Russia would be the leader of
international revolution. “(Tjhis weak, ignorant people, with an inborn inclination toward
anarchism,” Gorky contended, “is now called to be the spiritual leader of the world, the
Messiah of Europe.”

This spelled disaster for Gorky. How could Russia, exhausted from

*®®Maxim Goiky, Untimely Thoughts—Essays on Revolution, Culture mid the Bolsheviks, 1917-1918.
(New York; Paul Eriksson, Inc.), #43,3/16(3)/!8,141.
*“ Ibid., #198, 12/10(23)/17, p. 106.
*®*lbid.
*®*Ibid., #43,3/16(3)/18, p. 141.
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three years of total war and reeling from the revolutionary regime changes of 1917,
effectively lead a socialist transformation in Europe? Gorky did not believe Russia was fit to
perform the socialist “messianism” of the Bolsheviks. “[Tjhis unfortunate Russia,” Gorky
bemoans, “is being dragged and shoved to Golgotha to be crucified for the salvation of the
world.” *®’
Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and Mensheviks, other socialist parties of the RSDLP,
rejected the Bolshevik claim to power after October 1917. They were committed to
parliamentary democracy, and considered the Bolshevik seizure of power as madness, **°
and believed Russia had no option but to fight a defensive war against Germany, However,
unlike the Left SRs and Left Communists, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks
did not advocate a revolutionary war. *** Menshevik and SR leaders believed a defensive
war offered an opportunity to halt the escalation of civil strife in Russia and to mobilize
support for national unity and for the Constituent Assembly.

Also, they held that the

bargaining position of a Russian government vis-à-vis the Germans would be stronger if a
legitimate government formed by the Constituent Assembly were in power. *" “The
seizure of power carried out by the Bolshevik Party,” an SR declaration claimed, “is a crime
against the motherland and the Revolution[.]”

'" ’Ibid.
“The Bolsheviks’ Socialist OppoiKnts dencwmce the Bolshevik Revolution and leave foe Congress of
Soviets,” Wade, Documents o f Soviet: vol. 1 ,10/25-6 (11/7-8)1917,1.
*" Vlafomir Brovkin. Jhe Mensheviks after October: Socialist Opposition and the Rise o f the Bolshevik
Dictatorship (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987), 65.
Broridn, Mensheviks afUr October, 67.
Ibid., 65.
"^IWd., 2.
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For the socialist opposition in Russia, the Bolshevik claim to power would incite civil
war and break-up the Constituent Assembly.

Like Gorky, the SRs considered the

socialization of Russia untenable. They believed the Bolsheviks would only exhaust the
workingclass and thwart the revolution. The SRs predicted a catastrophic end to the
Russian Revolution when Bolshevik promises failed to materialize.
Mensheviks and SRs further asserted that the Bolsheviks enforced “dictatorship of the
proletariat” as a means to preserve their monopoly of power. From the Menshevik point of
view, the Bolsheviks had demonstrated with the Brest Peace that their top priority was the
survival of their party dictatorship and not the defense of Russia. *" A Menshevik/SR
manifesto against the Bolsheviks declared that “the Bolshevik Government has now no
other aim than to preserve its own power at all costs, and that to gain this object it is ready
to sacrifice all the conquests of the Revolution[.]”

The “sheer dictatorship” of the

Bolsheviks created a situation in which the only solution, as was the case under tsarism,
was the forcible overthrow of Bolshevik power.
Karl Kautsky, a prominent German socialist, gave the most fundamental criticism of
the Bolshevik Revolution in his pamphlet The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Whereas Lenin
distinguished the social-democratic “schism” between defensism and defeatism during the
war, Kautsky differentiated between democracy and dictatorship. Socialism was
unthinkable without democracy. He did not accept that the workingclasses would be
emancipated only after the eradication of bourgeois power; rather, the organization of
"®Ibid.
"®Ibid.
" ’ Ibid., 71.
118
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workers through political participation (suffrage) and action (elections) would free the
proletariat. Democracy was essential for the building of a socialist system of power. “Only
under the influence of democracy,” Kautsky stated, “does the proletariat attain that
maturity which it needs to be able to bring about Socialism, and democracy supplies the
surest means for testing [Socialism’s] maturity.” *“
Kautsky also criticized the revolutionary foreign policy of the Bolsheviks. He attacked
the Bolshevik postulation that Russia was the starting point for general European
revolution. W ith that supposition not yet realized, Kautsky did not blame Europe’s
proletariat for leaving the Russian Revolution by leaving it “in the lurch.” *" Kautsky
referenced Marx in saying that revolution cannot be made, but must arise out of
conditions. The Bolsheviks did not appreciate, Kautsky stated, that the conditions in
Western Europe “were so different from those of Russia that a revolution there [in Russia]
would not necessarily provoke one here [in Western and (Central Europe].” *“ It came as
no surprise to Kautsky, then, that Larin and his cohorts were forced to curtail their
mandate for unbridled revolution. By staking all on the “card of the general European
Revolution,” the Bolsheviks adopted a course which brought them up against insoluble
problems.

An egregious peace had to be accepted, Kautsky argued. The weaker the

material and intellectual conditions needed for creation of a socialist society, the more the
Bolsheviks felt obliged to replace what was lacking by the exercise of naked power, by

Karl Kautsity, The Dictatorship o f the Proleteoiat (Aim Aibor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), 42.
‘2’ Ibid., 63.
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dictatorship. “So it became inevitable,” Kautsky concluded, “that [the Bolsheviks] should
put dictatorship in place of democracy.”*^*
Kautsky concluded his work by stating that the Bolsheviks had misinterpreted Marx’s
conception of proletarian dictatorship. Whereas Marx promulgated the “dictatorship of the
proletariat” as a political condition and not a form of government, the proletarian dictatorship
of Soviet Russia was nothing but a “grandiose attempts to dear by bold leaps” the obstacles
offered by the successive phases of normal development

Kautsky ended his pamphlet

by posing a metaphor between Bolshevik revolutionary policy and a pregnant woman,
“who performs the most foolish exercises in order to shorten the period of gestation, which
makes her impatient, and thereby causes a premature birth.” *“
Rosa Luxemburg responded more favorably to the October Revolution and the
revolutionary policies of the Bolsheviks. Whereas Kautsky fell into the defensist camp of
the SPD, Luxemburg was one of the few prominent socialists who—like Karl Liebkneicht—
rejected the wartime stance of the SPD, and favored the provocation of international
revolution. Throughout the war, Lenin and the Bolsheviks referred repeatedly to
Luxemburg as one of the few socialists who could effectively lead a proletarian revolution
in Germany. By the time of the October Revolution, Luxemburg openly opposed the
defensism of the SPD and favored an immediate revolution in Germany. She viewed the
Bolshevik revolution as a ray of hope for international socialism. In her pamphlet The
Russian Revolution, she analyzed the significance of Bolshevik ascendancy in Russia.

Ibid., 65.
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'“ ibid., 98.
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Whereas Lenin based Russia’s maturity for revolution on its “backwardness,”
Luxemburg believed the German proletariat displayed true backwardness by not fulfilling
its “historic task” of igniting international revolution.'^^ Like Lenin, Luxemburg believed
the Bolsheviks fulfilled the historic mission abandoned by the German proletariat.
According to Luxemburg, the Bolsheviks performed “the historic service of having
proclaimed from the very beginning, and having followed with iron consistency, those
tactics which alone could. . . drive the revolution ahead.”

The Bolsheviks were the only

group that really carried on a socialist policy.
Unlike Kautsky, Luxemburg supported a rapid revolutionary process. Non-violent
revolution was unfeasible. Marx had stipulated that in most European countries “the lever
of our revolution must be farce-, it is force to which,” Marx continues, “we must someday
appeal in order to erect the rule on the labor [.]”

For Luxemburg there was no time for

the peaceful development of socialism through democracy. “[Ejither the revolution must
advance at a rapid, stormy and resolute tempo,” lAJxembutg stated, “or it is quite soon
thrown backward behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by counter
revolution.”

Adopting a famous Marxian metaphor, Luxemburg likened the progress of

revolution to a driving locomotive. Either the rushing locomotive drives forward “full
steam ahead” to the most extreme point of its “historical ascent,” or it “rolls back by its
own weight” to the “starring point at the bottom .”

Those who would stifle revolution
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“half way up the hill,” Luxemburg continued, will be dragged down with it “irredeemably
into the abyss.”

Luxemburg commended the Bolsheviks on their seizure of power and

installation of a revolutionary program. Because the Bolsheviks went beyond simply
protecting bourgeois democracy by creating a proletarian dictatorship, Luxemburg stated,
the “October uprising was not only the actual salvation of the Russian Revolution [but] was
also the salvation of the honor of international socialism.”
Luxemburg praised the Bolsheviks for fulfilling the “immortal historical service” of
having marched at the head of the international proletariat, with the conquest of political
power and “the practical placing of the problem” of socialism’s realization.

The October

Revolution was only the beginning, Luxemburg stated. The problem of socialism could
only be posed, not solved, in Russia. And in this sense, Luxemburg concluded, “the future
everywhere belongs to ‘Bolshevism.’”

"®Ibid
Ibid, 39-40.
' “ Ibid, 80.
'“ Ibid, 80.

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VIII.

“ORGANIZING AND PREPARING”
Bolshevik party policy changed with the adaptation to revolutionary defensism. Party
organization and discipline became the main objectives for the Bolsheviks. Marx himself
had stated that “to be able to fight at all the working class must organize itself at home as a
dass, and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle.”

Only with proper

organization and party discipline could the Bolsheviks effectively eqport their Marxist
revolution. The Bolsheviks understood that they were preparing for an international class
war. The Bolsheviks stipulated their revolutionary tasks at the 6* Party Congress in August
1917. The Party was to take on the role of the “foremost fighter” against counter
revolution. It must defend “all the rights and liberties won”; must defend “all mass
organizations”; and must devote all its efforts “to organizing and preparing its forces” for
the ideal revolutionary moment.

“It will then be the task of these revolutionary classes,”

concluded the Congress, “to devote all efforts to taking the state power into their own
hands and to guiding the state, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the
advanced countries, toward peace and the socialist reconstruction of society.”'®’ The quality

'®’ Tucker, M arx-Er^els Reader, quoting Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” 5/1875, 533, (Emphasis
Marx’s]
“On the Political Situation (resolution r f VI Party Congress),” CPSU: vol. 1,8/3/17,254-55.
'®’ lbid.
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of their revolutionary response would determine the overall success of socialism over
capitalism.
Already viewing themselves as the vanguard party of European socialism, the Bolsheviks
amplified their primacy over the global social-democratic movement by declaring
themselves the Russian Communist Party (RCP) on 8 March 1918. They did this for two
reasons. First, they detached themselves from a social-democratic movement that had been
demolished by the Great War. The RCP’s principle task would now be “to unite the
scattered Communist forces, [and] to form a single Communist Party in every country . . .
in order to increase tenfold the work of preparing the proletariat for the conquest of
political power [.]”

The Bolshevik split with their social-democratic colleagues around

Europe was complete. There was no more room for a rapprochement in relations. The SPD
and the like were irrelevant to the Russian Communists. Second, changing the party name
solidified the Bolshevik claim as inheritors of Marxist tradition. By adopting “Communist”
as their party name, the Bolsheviks invoked a Marxian reference dating from the mid
nineteenth century. In Marx’s famous Communist Manifesto, “the Communist Party” is the
revolutionary body that will liberate the working masses from bourgeois oppression. The
Manifesto declared the Communists “the most advanced and resolute section of the
workingclass parties of every country [and] that section which pushes forward all
others [.]”'*' Marx stated that the Communist Party had the advantage of “clearly
understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results” of the

140««pheses on tte Fundamoital Tasks of the 2d Qmgress of the Communist International,” Lenin, CW:
vol. XXXI, 7/4/20,189.
Tudcer, Marx-Engels Reader, quoting Marx, “Communist Nfonifesto,” 2/1848,484.
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proletarian movement

According to Marx, Communists are distinguished from other

workingclass parties in two ways. First Communists reveal through national struggles the
“common interests of the entire proletariat.”

Second, Communists “always and

everywhere” represent the interests of the socialist movement as a whole throughout the
various stages of the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie.'^
The Bolsheviks, then, were making a bold statement to the world. Changing their party
name signaled to all workingclass constituencies of Europe the new party’s primary role as
the protagonist for socialist revolution. There would be no higher authority on the
prosecution of revolution than the RCP. Lenin stated that it was only “under the
leadership of [the Communist Party] that the proletariat is capable of displaying the full
might of its revolutionary onslaught [.]”

International revolution would occur only

under the leadership of the RCP. In a statement by the Communist International in July
1920, political revolution could be implemented only by a political party; workers could
not carry out revolution without having an independent political party to represent them.
The necessity of a political party for the proletariat would cease when a complete
abolition of classes occurred; until then, the “international organization of the proletariat
will be strong only i f . . . party organization and activity are firmly established.”

H ie

Bolsheviks were no longer a voice solely for the workingclass of Russia, but were now the

"“ Ibid.
""®Ibid.
""Ibid.
' “ “Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Conmmnist International,” Lenin,
CW: vol. XXXL 7/4/20,188.
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voice for the entire European working-class. International proletarian revolution hereafter
accord with the dictates of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia.
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CHAPTER DC

DEFENDING THE “SOCIALIST FATHERLAND”
Revolutionary defensism was quickly put to the test when civil war broke out in Russia
in mid-1918. According to Lenin, the Bolsheviks had been defensists since the October
Revolution. Since 25 October 1917 (November 7*), Lenin argued, the Bolsheviks
championed the defense of the fatherland because “we have shown by deeds that we have
broken away from imperialism

We are in favor of defending the Russian Soviet

Socialist Republic.”
Bolshevik forces—“Reds”—defended their claim to power against a conglomeration of
opposition. Collectively known as the “Whites,” forces loyal to the tsar, disgruntled
peasants, Russian nationalists, and socialist opponents all comprised the opposition to
Soviet rule. This opposition was buttressed by the intervention of a European and extraEuropean alliance. Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Ukraine, Finland and others deployed troops and lent battle materials to the effort
of eradicating revolutionary power in Russia. Soviet Russia posed an ideological menace to
powers like Great Britain and France. The Bolshevik demand for international proletarian
revolution threatened the maintenance of power in post-war Europe. For newly-founded
states like Poland, Finland, and Ukraine, Soviet Russia was a national threat. These young

“A Painful but Necessary Lesson,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXVn, 2/25/18,64.
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States were desperate to uphold their national integrity, and feared a resurgence of Russian
imperialism (regardless of its ideological foundation).
“W hite” opposition suffered from a lack of centralized organization. Other than
opposing the Bolsheviks, this collection of forces held no central ideology that bound them
together. Imperialists despised their fall from power, and peasants feared the
collectivization of their agricultural stocks by the Bolsheviks; however, each of these
factions fundamentally opposed the theoretical goals of the other. Imperialists were
unlikely to fight for the defaise of peasant holdings, and peasants were unlikely to fight for
the reinstatement of empire in Russia. Moreover, the allied powers lacked any form of
cohesion. There was no coordination among the great powers on their objectives in Russia.
Each fighting force deployed to their respective area, maintained a sphere of influence, but
failed to coordinate their local directives into larger objective of defeating the Bolsheviks.
According to Richard Debo, this incoherent allied policy enabled Lenin and the Soviet
government to strengthen their position. “Continued intervention provided the Bolsheviks
with the opportunity to broaden the base of their government and enlist the active
cooperation of many individuals in particular, who had previously opposed the Soviet
regime.”

This collective, relative indifference to the Bolsheviks was due not only to more

pressing concerns but also to the deeply entrenched and widely held assumption that the
life ejqpectancy of the Soviet government was minimal.'®®
The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, possessed a centralized ideology that sustained
them throughout the desperate years of civil war. Much Bolshevik strength, Debo argues.
Richard Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy o fSovietRussia, 1918-1921 (Montreal
and Boffido, McGill-Qneen’s University Press, 1992), 8.
'®®Ibid., 402.
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“came from the ability to monopolize political power in Soviet Russia.”

The simple

message of social justice, class warfare, and an end to imperialism appealed deeply to
people weary of war and oppression.

By offering land to the peasants, factories to

workers and self-determination to all nationalities of the old empire, the Bolsheviks
appealed to the people in ways its rival parties could not. Surrounded by local and foreign
enemies, the Bolsheviks viewed Soviet Russia as a fortress of socialism. Just as the
Muscovites held to Moscow as a “great magnet attracting all parts of the periphery,” so the
Bolsheviks “entrenched themselves in the economic fastness of old Muscovy” and halted all
enemies who tried to root them o u t '®®Soviet Russia was the only bastion for international
revolution, and it was the duty of the Bolsheviks to maintain the Marxian credo against all
opposition. Vastly inferior in numbers and equipment, the Bosheviks’ common purpose
was their only reliable weapon during most of the civil war. And the Bolsheviks were easily
able to discredit their adversaries as paid agents of foreign powers because of allied support
for the “Whites.”

The Soviet government was free to speak in the name of Russia—a

Soviet Russia to be sure—but Russian all the same.'®®

This fortress mentality left an indelible mark on the conduct of Bolshevik foreign
policy. Allied intervention only enhanced the symbiotic relationship between Soviet Russia
and international proletarian revolution. Civil war also shored up inter-party friction.
Whereas late 1917 and early 1918 witnessed a rupture over the proper course for
revolutionary foreign policy, the civil war mended this inter-party hostility. All elements of
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the Party rallied behind the call to defend the “Socialist Fatherland” when they saw foreign
interventionists and recalcitrant imperialists allying for the defeat of Soviet Russia. By
1919-20, the extortionate Peace of Brest-Litovsk was hailed as a trium ph of Soviet foreign
policy because it had allowed the Bolsheviks to retain power in Russia.
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CHAPTER X.

“ONE GREAT GAMBLE”
The Bolsheviks watched the Great W ar with bated breath throughout 1918. By
October, when it became clear the Central Powers would lose the conflict, Soviet Russia
expected international revolution to rescue it from the depths of civil war. W hen the
German revolution finally erupted in early November 1918, the Bolsheviks believed their
hopes had been achieved. A radiogram from Moscow proclaimed that German soldiers had
arrested their generals, that Kaiser Wilhelm had abdicated, and that general strike had
swept major cities in Germany.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee promptly

annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was believed that now “a true peace among nations”
would be built upon the principles conducive to the “fraternal relations between the toilers
of all countries.”

Such an international compact among the proletariat of Soviet Russia

and the Central Powers would “create and consolidate a socialist order upon the ruins of
militarism and economic slavery.” '®®The Bolsheviks believed their work and preparation
would support the revolting masses in Germany.
The German Communist revolution did not last. “Though sporadic outbreaks have
taken place, particularly in Berlin” a British observer wrote, “the comparative ease with
which these conflagrations have been suppressed by a government as weak and vacillating
“Radiogram from Moscow to one and all,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXXVL 11/10/18,495.
“Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee annulling the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,” Degras,
Soviet Docs.: vol. 1,11/13/18,124.
' “ Ibid., 125.
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as the present German one proves that Bolshevism is not a plant which flourishes on
German soil.”

The murder of Karl Liehknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and the subsequent

failure of the Spartacist (German Communists) movement proved that there was a strong
anti-Bolshevik feeling in Germany. To be sure, the Imperial regime was replaced by the
socialist government of Friedrich Ebert; however, Ebert and his colleagues were the same
socialists who adopted a defensist posture towards the war. The Weimar government (as
Ebert’s regime came to be known) would not be a useful instrument for proletarian
dictatorship in central Europe. Ebert’s regime strove to maintain the German state and a
German sense of national pride. It called for a more democratic political process, and
attempted to appease all elements of dissent by allowing political representation for the
demographically diverse German population. For Lenin and his comrades, this was pettybourgeois socialism. No government, the Bolsheviks argued, could effectively root out
imperial-bourgeois influence when those elements were allowed to exist Socialism could
only be accomplished when the capitalists and landowners were completely destroyed.
By the end of January 1919, it became clear that the German revolution would not
follow the example of Soviet Russia. Germany had once again failed to fulfill the socialist
goal assigned to it by Marx. Soviet Russia was now a socialist island in a sea of capitalism.
The predictions of war-induced revolutions throughout Europe proved partially correct
Several other European countries experienced post-war turmoil. France faced mutinies in
its army and England faced an insurrection in Ireland. The most notable post-war turmoil
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came with the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into four autonomous states:
Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Still, post-war trauma failed to overhaul
the socioeconomic system and colonial oppression of European capitalism. The Bolsheviks
stood alone to defend themselves against counter-revolution.
During 1920, amid the turmoil of civil war, the Bolsheviks attempted to export their
revolution to the rest of Europe. Conflicts with Poland led to war that featured Bolshevik
efforts to produce “revolution from without." There is no consensus on the origin of the
Russo-Polish War. Beyond dispute was the ambition of Polish ruler Jozef Pilsudski to
extend Poland’s boundaries, and to ejq)loit the weakness of the Soviet Republic.

The

Soviets viewed Pilsudsld’s attack as part of the larger “W hite” effort to dislodge
revolutionary power in Russia. The Soviets hoped to settle the border dispute to their
advantage by taking the war to Poland. Also, Polish aggression provided an opportunity to
eliminate a security risk by allowing the Red Army to assist the Polish proletariat in seizing
power.

Even more tantalizing was the prospect of creating a “bridge” across Red Poland

to the revolutionary proletariat of Germany and seizing the elusive world revolution by
major force.

“Across the corpse of ‘W hite’ Poland,” an order to Red Army soldiers

read, “shines the road to world conflagration. O n our bayonets we will carry peace and
happiness to laboring humanity.”'®®
The Red Army drove across Poland th ro u ^ o u t the summer of 1920 and reached the
outskirts of Warsaw in August. Polish forces put up a spectacular defense on the Vistula
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and forced the Red Army into retreat by 16 August. O n 12 October, after Soviet forces had
pulled back beyond the Nieman, an armistice was concluded. The Treaty of Riga, which
officially ended the war on 18 March 1921, defined a territorial settlement to Poland’s
advantage.

More importantly, though, the Treaty of Riga ended the Bolsheviks’ “one

great gamble” on behalf of the world revolution.

It became starkly clear to the

Bolsheviks that international revolution could not be precipitated with a little push.
Proletarian uprising was something that could not be predicted or forced.
The RCP had to concede that international revolution was not in the foreseeable
future. “[Tjhe international situation,” Lenin stated to the 10^ Party Congress, was
“defining itself by an extremely slow development of the world’s revolutionary movement,
and we in no way presume on a speedy victory of our policy.” '®®Soviet Russia would have
to preserve singje-handedly the cause of revolution.
This was the final transformation of revolutionaries into statesmen. Thereafter,
preservation of the state took top priority for the RCP. The state was the revolution;
revolution was the state. Russian Communists had no choice but to accept their
transformation. The Russian Revolution stood alone; the promise of an international
uprising of the proletariat proved groundless. The RCP understood that it could not
equate the socio-political developments of the present to the materialist tradition of
Marxism. In the early 1920s the RCP was in uncharted territory. Any action was justifiable,
so long as Soviet Russia remained true to its Marxist roots. That Marxist tradition, in turn.
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became inextricably boundup with the condition of Soviet Russia. Marx’s warning that
socialist revolution would suffocate if relegated to one country was essentially superceded
by the RCP’s predicament. “Socialism in one country” became the theoretical revision that
underlined the Communist agenda into the early 1920s.
Now Soviet Russia would seek legitimacy among the states of the world. This was a
policy both of appeasement and defiance. By ceasing their hasty proclamations for
international revolution, the RCP hoped to ease the tensions between it and the capitalist
states of Europe (and thereby halt the threat of concerted bourgeois counter-revolution).
Conversely, Russian Communists hoped the survival of Soviet Russia would demonstrate
to the masses of the world—not just workers in Europe—the vitality and promise of
socialism. The Soviet Socialist Republic would be the ultimate form of propaganda.
Rapprochement became the revolutionary policy of the RCP.
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CHAPTER XI.

“STABILIZATION AND PREPARATION”
The Genoa Conference, held in the late Spring of 1922, was the first European-wide
meeting convened to address sociopolitical hJlout in Europe after the end of the war.
Normalization and stabilization of economic trade relations among European states was
the meeting’s primary objective. The Genoa Conference was the first diplomatic assembly
which invited delegates from Soviet Russia. It was also the first diplomatic conference since
the end of the Great W ar to host Communist representatives of Russia. While the
Western powers were uneasy about granting de jure recognition to the Soviet state, the
settling of war debts took precedence.
The RCP had its own agenda for the Genpa Conference. Lenin and his colleagues
viewed the Conference as a prime opportunity to improve their diplomatic standing among
European states. The Genoa Conference granted Soviet Russia a chance to display its right
to a “fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states.”

The

Socialist Republic had managed to maintain power throughout three years of civil war.
Although the hope for international socialist revolution failed to materialize, the possibility
of proletarian rule had been maintained. In this respect, Lenin stated to a meeting of RCP
officials in November 1920, the “Republic’s international position today provides the best

“Our fixeign and dranesticpositioo and party tasks,” Lenin, CW: vol. XXXL 11/21/20,412.
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and most precise confirmation of all our plans and all our policy.” *** Since Soviet Russia
had managed to thwart all challenges to its existence, Lenin and his colleagues believed
their socialist movement and program was “historically justified.” How could it be, Lenin
asked in a speech given in late December 1921, that the “efforts of three years to crush us
have aU come to nothing?"

The answer lay in “the laboring masses of the world.”

Although Soviet Russia had not received the “speedy direct support” from the
international proletariat against capitalist aggression, the RCP believed it received support
of “another sort,” namely, the sympathy of those laboring masses in countries hostile to the
Socialist Republic.

This sympathy, from the laboring masses still under bourgeois

oppression, rendered futile all attacks upon Soviet Russia.
The Socialist Republic of Russia was now the undisputed spearhead of international
socialism and the RCP, consequently, was the spokesman for all the working classes of
Europe. The “breathing spell" was over. Soviet Russia had effectively staved off counter
revolutionary forces which had encircled it for three years. “Today we can speak,” Lenin
declared, “not merely of a breathing space, but of a real chance, of a new and lengthy
period of development.”

The task of the Party, therefore, required modifications. It was

time, as Lenin metaphorically described it, that “the train” should be switched over to
other rails. “The switching of this heavy load on to other rails, along a track on which there
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are no rails at all in places,” Lenin stated, “calls for concentrated attention, knowledge and
very great persistence.”
Geotgii Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs since the Brest signing,
expounded on this shift to “other rails” in February 1921. Conceding that active
propaganda failed to agitate revolution in the West, Chicherin believed the Soviet
government had to stabilize relations with capitalist states. “It is not to our advantage to be
feared,” Chicherin stated. “The official recognition of our representatives, the development
of business activity, quiet propaganda and insidious strengthening of our authority—that is
the aim of our work.”

Only by utilizing purely diplomatic situations, Chicherin argued,

would Soviet Russia succeed in creating the situation necessary to complete party work and
to ensure victory for the workers’ government.

Chicherin believed Soviet Russia had to

practice a policy of “stabilization and preparation.” Stabilization of Soviet Russia’s
international position among the community of states; preparation for the international
revolution. These two policy goals were simultaneously contradictory and complimentary,
and were based in two separate institutions. O n one hand the People’s Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), led by Chicherin, sought diplomatic peace with capitalist
states of the West; on the other, the Third Communist International (Comintern)
continued propagandizing the motive for international revolution. While one Communist
institution strove to find its place among capitalist states of the West, the other institution
worked to destroy the global capitalist system.
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This dual nature of Soviet foreign policy proved problematic by early 1921. In late
January, the Narkomindel conceded that the “attempt to run two organizations parallel
and independent has proved a failure [.]”

Conflicts and misunderstandings between

official Soviet representatives and the Comintern had a “bad effect on the general work of
the Foreign Office abroad,” and the only solution lay in the “absolute subordination” of
the Third International tx> the interests of the Narkomindel.

TTiis subordination of the

Comintern became apparent by that following summer. In its program for the year 19211922, the Third International decreed that it would be “the incarnation of peaceful
struggle.”

In this search for “stabilization and preparaticoi” toward the West, the

Comintern forfeited all authority to the Socialist Republic of Russia. “For the
strengthening erf"our peaceful conquests it is true that real force is necessary, but let the
exercise of that force belong to the State. . . which is the embodiment of world-power for
the workers and toilers of all countries.”

A week earlier Lenin corroborated this view on

Soviet Russia’s preminence, in a speech to the Third International.
“The birthplace and only home of Communism is Russia. The dictatorship o f the
proletariat in this country represents a guarantee of the ultimate success of
Communism throughout the world. W hile the Soviet power holds Russia, so long will
it be possible to speak of a Communist movement in the whole world. [Tjhe power of
the Soviet Government in Russia must be upheld by all possible means.”*^

"Dedskms of the Stqareme Soviet cf Presidents of Sub-Departments wM* the Commissariat for Foreign
AfOairs,” Watts and Watts, British Documents: vol. IV, 1/27/21,260.
” *HMd.
‘Tiogram of the Tbiid International for 1921-1922,” Ibid.: vol. V, l/TIfll, 223.
Ibid., 223.
"Speed* by Lenin at the Ccmgress of the Third IntemationaL” Watts and Watts, B riti^ Documents', vol.
V, 7/20/21,201.
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This was the dialectical background for Soviet Russia’s participation at Genoa. The
Soviet delegation—led again by Chicherin—strove to create a relationship of peaceful
coexistence between them and the rest of Europe. After a week’s discussion failed to settle
the war debt issue betweai Russia and its former Allies the Soviet delegation signed the
Rapallo Treaty with Germany on 16 April 1922. This agreement consisted of six articles
providing for the immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, and the
mutual repudiation of claims for war costs and damages.

W ith this treaty, Germany

accorded Soviet Russia full and unconditional recognition.
The Rapallo Treaty, while it normalized relations with Germany, did not imply
international reconciliation or a policy of “live and let live.” As Jacobson argues, in the
Bolshevik theory of foreign relations, “socialist and capitalist systems remained
antagonistic; neither would nor could be transformed by coexisting peacefully.”

Peaceful

coexistence referred to the rapprochement of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and
the industrialized capitalist states of Europe. “Peaceful coexistence,” Jacobson explains,
“was a state of international relations. . . not a policy.”

Ulam concurs. W hile Soviet

Russia had taken the first step in reconciling itself with the community of nations, Ulam
argues that the RCP was returning under their own conditions.

Soviet Russia was not

giving up “her role as the center of a worldwide revolutionary organization dedicated to

Cande Fink, The Genoa Conference: European IMphmacy, 1921-1922. (Ch^)el Hill and London,
University of bkxth Carolina Press, 1984), 173.
"'Ib id .
Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics, 26.
Ibid. pnqihasis Jacobson’s]
Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 129.
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propaganda and other activities to overthrow ultimately every other form of
government.”" ’
While maintaining its revolutionary mandate, the RCP relied upon traditional
diplomacy to reach socialist ends. According to Uldricks, the tactic of allying with a great
power was hardly a Marxian concept. “It was the same balance of power strategy employed
by the most able diplomats of the Old R ^ m e .”

R.C. Nation believes Soviet Russia

came to terms with the “dilemma of coexistence” at Rapallo.

By allying itself with a

major European power. Nation argues, Soviet Russia broke the ring of isolation that had
been cast around it by the civil war intervention.'®*
Marxist revolution was now fully incorporated into the Bolshevik state. The RCP
believed Soviet Russia would be the herald and guardian of international socialist
revolution. Domestic issues and foreign relations of the state were actually the
international concerns of all workers in the world. Preservation of a socialist state
correlated with the safeguarding of international socialism. De facto recognition was not
enough. Soviet Russia already received that at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with Germany
in 1918. For the RCP, de jure recognition of Soviet Russia confirmed the sagacity of their
revolutionary policies—and shifts—from October 1917 to April 1922. The acknowledgment
of Soviet sovereignty marked the international acknowledgment that the Bolsheviks had
won the Russian Civil War. ‘*®

" ’ Ibid., 129-30.
'** UIdridcs, Diplomacy and Ideology, 148.
Nation, Blade Earth, Red Star, 43.
'“ Ibid.
Ddx), Survival and Consolidation, 342.
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CONCLUSION

Through their foreign diplomacy, Lenin and his comrades balanced their foundation in
Marxian philosophy with raison d’etat Accepting defeats, dragging their bellies in the mud,
and making compromises were necessary measures to protect Marx’s revolutionary
mandate. Lenin and his colleagues, throughout strenuous years of revolution, civil war, and
invasion, always kept international socialist revolution as their ultimate goal. The foreign
policy of Soviet Russia was always formulated under the rubric of inciting an international
uprising that would liberate the proletarian masses from bourgeois domination.
Between August 1914 and October 1917, the Bolsheviks were intent on producing
international socialist revolution. They believed civil war in all European states was the
most expedient method for igniting such an international uprising. Lenin and his Russian
comrades became disenchanted whm their socialist counterparts (particularly German
Social-Democrats) throughout Europe failed to contribute to the dissemination of
international revolution. A “schism” divided those socialists who defended their national
loyalties (“defensists”) and those who prescribed to international loyalties (“defeatists”).
Throughout this schism, the Bolsheviks began viewing themselves as the protectors of
Marxist doctrine; the believed the SPD and other European socialist parties had failed their
theoretical mandate to promulgate Marxian revolution.
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Lenin and his comrades viewed the Russian Revolution of October 1917 as the first act
in the development of an international revolution. W hen it became strikingly clear an
international uprising would not occur after both the end of the Great W ar and the
outbreak of civil war in Russia, the Bolsheviks adjusted their revolutionary strategy. They
adopted a defensist stance in the interest of preserving their socialist revolution, and they
were forced to formulate a foreign policy that reflected both their commitment to Marxist
ideals and their obligation to protect Soviet Russia. Initially, through a foreign diplomacy
based on compromise, Lenin and his comrades accepted the harsh Peace of Brest-Litovsk
because they believed Soviet Russia was the only stalwart foundation for socialism in wartorn Europe. They deemed it irrational to expend the gains of the October Revolution in a
unilateral revolutionary war against much-stronger capitalist enemies. By accepting the
Brest Peace, Lenin believed Soviet Russia would receive a “breathing spell” during which it
could strengthen and prepare proletarian forces for international class war against the
bourgeoisie.
During this respite, the Bolsheviks heightened their relevance to the entire socialdemocratic movement of Europe by proclaiming themselves the Russian Communist Party.
This action underscored the fact that Lenin and his comrades had become the socialist
vanguard not just of Russian workers but of the entire European proletariat. The RCP
claimed to be the undisputed herald of socialist revolution. They, as protectors of Marxist
revolution, would dictate the opportune moment for proletarian uprising. U ntil then,
Soviet Russia would serve as the epicenter for revolutionary Marxism.
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By the early 1920s, after surviving three years of civil war, Soviet Russia strove to
stabilize relations with the capitalist states of the West. Post-war turmoil and Soviet
propaganda had failed to engender an international socialist revolution in Europe. The
new diplomatic goal for Lenin and his comrades was to attain an equal footing among the
community of nations. This was pursued not as a submission of revolutionary goals, but as
a way to protect Soviet Russia’s resilience through years of revolutionary crisis and
international assault. Finding equal footing among the community of nations would
promulgate the attributes of socialism to workers still under capitalist oppression, and
would demonstrate to those bourgeois governments that Soviet Russia was a permanent
member of the international community. The Treaty of Rapallo signified this new posture
in Soviet foreign diplomacy.
A great breath of experience separated the Russian Communists of 1922 with the
Bolsheviks of 1914. Through world war, revolution, and civil war, Lenin and his comrades
managed to scale insurmountable odds in the interest of Marxist revolution. Soviet Russia
had graduated from an infantile and isolated revolution in a crumbling state in late 1917,
into a burgeoning center of revolutionary Marxism by 1922. And the Bolsheviks had been
transformed from a hothead menagerie of revolutionary émigrés scattered throughout
Europe in 1914, into revolutionary statesmen who had successfully incorporated socialist
revolution into state power.
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